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1 INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 1
1 Introduction and theoretical background
Before we can motivate the topic of our thesis, we need to sketch the general setting.
Articial intelligence, AI for short, is one branch of applied computer science. Simply
put, it is concerned with modelling intelligent behaviour on machines  computers and
robots in particular. Besides problem solving, planning, learning, reasoning etc. the
representation of knowledge is one aspect of AI.
How should information, rules etc. be encoded so that (correct) conclusions can be
drawn automatically? In order to model intelligent behaviour, this question must be
answered  if not in general, then at least within a certain scope. One question follows
directly. How can this be achieved in a way that modications can be made?
1.1 Belief Revision
The core aspect of belief revision is the investigation of how a rational agent should
modify its beliefs or knowledge  generally called the epistemic state  in the light of
new information. There are several approaches to that question and they are based on
dierent assumptions about how the knowledge of the agent is represented, what it is
about, etc.
As our work is merely motivated by a belief revision framework, it will suce to
present some of the basic ideas of belief revision without examining them in detail.
The two main approaches to belief revision are foundationalism and coherentism.
Whereas the former distinguishes a particular set of beliefs as the basic beliefs from which
all others can be derived, the latter does not. So in the foundationalist approach a belief
is justied if it can in some way be derived from the basic beliefs which are self-justifying.
In the coherentist one it is the relationship to (all) other beliefs which determines whether
a belief is justied.
This has a direct inuence on whether revision is done on a belief base or a belief set.
A belief set is understood to be a set of propositions closed under consequence, i.e. if K
is a belief set and ' follows from K then ' 2 K. A belief base, on the other hand, is not
necessarily closed under consequence. It just is a set of propositions.
The epistemic state of an agent could be represented in terms of a belief set or a belief
base. If the latter is the case, the knowledge of the agent would still be seen as everything
that can be derived from the belief base. It should be clear that dierent belief bases can
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lead to the same set of believed propositions.
Common assumptions are that the epistemic state of an agent is consistent, i.e. that it
does not allow a contradiction to be derived, and that after incorporating new information
the epistemic state remains consistent. It should be clear that new information could
contradict current beliefs. This means that some old or the new information must be
modied or discarded in order to ensure a consistent state. The attempt to keep the loss
of information as small as possible is known as information economy and it is a further
main aspect of many of the revision approaches.
If the new information happens to be consistent with the current beliefs it suces
to insert it. This simple operation is known as expansion. If the new information '
contradicts the current knowledge, however, a more complicated mechanism has to be
used. One of the standard approaches is to remove the contradicting part from the
epistemic state, i.e. contract :', and then expand with '. The Levi identity formalizes
this by stating that revision is the composed operation of rst contracting by the negation
and then expanding.
Here contraction is an intermediate step for revision and often contraction is seen as
having this purpose only. In the next section we will argue against this notion.
As the modelling of expansion seems obvious, the various belief revision approaches
deal with the question of how to model contraction in a rational way. The question is
how to decide which beliefs should be eliminated. If, for example, the belief set contains
f'; '!  g, and  is to be contracted, one of the two propositions has to be removed,
otherwise  could still be inferred. A choice between ' and ' !  must be made. So
one of the central points of all belief revision frameworks is how to make choices of that
kind.
Probably the most fundamental results are the AGM rationality postulates for belief
revision. They constitute properties that rational contraction and revision operations
should satisfy. These postulates or criticism concerning them and resulting suggestions
for modications often are the starting point for belief revision approaches.
There are also subtle dierences in the notion of what is represented in the knowledge
of an agent and therefore of what the new information represents. Generally, belief revision
is viewed in the light of an agent receiving information about a static world. The goal is
that after each revision step the agent's representation of the world is more correct than
before. New contradicting information means that previous assumptions about the world
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were wrong and have to be revised.
A dierent notion  termed belief update  assumes the world to be dynamic. That
is, contradicting information represents changes that have occured in the world. So while
belief revision tries to decide which beliefs should be contracted to allow a new one to
be consistently inserted, belief update tries to determine what changes in the world have
caused the new observation.
1.2 Motivation
Consider the following belief revision framework [1]
1
. The epistemic state of an agent is
represented by a sequence of propositions  = ('
1
; :::; '
n
) of a language. For now, let
that language be the usual propositional language L
p
, consisting of propositional letters
and being closed under the classical connectives.  could be interpreted as the sequence
of inputs the agent received, considering later propositions more reliable. The belief set
Bel () corresponding to this epistemic state is calculated iteratively, starting with the
set of tautologies and beginning at the back of the sequence adding one formula at a time
 if this can be done consistently.
In other words, propositions from the sequence that would produce an inconsistent
belief set are simply left out. It is obvious that the sequence could also be interpreted as
a linear ordering regarding importance of the propositions.
Denition 1.1.
Bel
i
()
def
=
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
Cn
L
p
(;) ; i = 0
BT
i
def
=Cn
L
p
(Bel
i 1
() [ f'
n+1 i
g) ; 0 < i  n and? =2 BT
i
Bel
i 1
() ; otherwise
Bel ()
def
= lim
i
Bel
i
()
Remark 1. Bel () = Bel
n
()
The equation in Remark 1 follows immediately from the denition of Bel. As there
are no further proposition left in  after n steps of the calculation, Bel
i
would not change
any more.
1
Notation and denitions are our own. If they do not correctly reect the intentions of the originators
of the framework, we are to blame.
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Revision
Revision, i.e. the consistent incorporation of information, of  by a proposition  is
realized by appending it to the sequence.
Denition 1.2. ('
1
; : : : ; '
n
)   
def
= ('
1
; : : : ; '
n
;  )
Example 2.  
1
= (a;:a):
Bel ((a;:a)) = Cn
L
p
(f:ag)
Bel ((a;:a)  a) = Cn
L
p
(fag)
At rst a is left out, because adding it to the belief set would conict with :a which
has higher priority. After the revision, :a is left out, because the new information
conicting with it has higher priority.
 
2
= (a; a! b;:b):
Bel ((a; a! b;:b)) = Cn
L
p
(fa! b;:bg)
Bel ((a; a! b;:b)  c) = Cn
L
p
(fa! b;:b; cg)
Together with the implication, a would create an inconsistency. Consequently, it
is left out. Revision with c has no modifying impact on the previous belief set, as
that proposition does not interact with anything earlier in the sequence, so it is just
added.
 
3
= (a; a! b;:b):
Bel ((a; a! b;:b)) = Cn
L
p
(fa! b;:bg)
Bel ((a; a! b;:b)  a) = Cn
L
p
(fa;:bg)
First a is left out as in the previous example, but after revision the implication is
neglected as now it is the weakest link in the chain .
Contraction
Example 3. An agent A whose current beliefs consist of f'g only, learns from another
agent B that f:';  g hold and accordingly changes its belief state to f:';  g. Afterwards
a more reliable source informs A that information obtained from B cannot be trusted.
It would be rational to expect that agent A now revises his beliefs to the old state.
Without a contraction operation, however, there is no possibility of getting rid of  other
than revising by : . But the result of this would not be the old belief state. This should
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illustrate that contraction must be viewed as a separate operation and not just as an
intermediate step for revision.
So, how can contraction of a proposition  be modelled in our belief revision frame-
work? One way of achieving it would be to remove all propositions that imply  from the
sequence.
Example 4. ('; '!  ;  )   = ('!  )
This is not satisfactory, because information might be lost if the contraction turns out
to have been unjustied. In the example the information that ' was once part of the
knowledge has disappeared. So the question is not just how to achieve contraction but
also how to be able to undo contraction if necessary.
Of course, the agent could store a sequence of all prior sequences in order to regain
information, but the resulting belief revision procedure would be very complicated. In
addition, this method bears the risk of wasting a lot of memory.
We do not consider the contraction of  by the introduction of : to be a desir-
able approach, either. There is an essential dierence between removing knowledge and
replacing it by its opposite, as could be seen in Example 3.
It would be nice to be able to just block  from being introduced into the belief set.
Therefore, we suggest to enrich the usual language of propositional logic L
p
by a means
to denote disbeliefs which create an inconsistency without implying the negation.
1.3 Goals of this work
If we had that language and the corresponding logic, we could achieve contraction of a
proposition ' in terms of revision by the disbelief in '. That is, we would not modify the
belief revision framework, but use it with a dierent underlying logic which allows us to
express both, revision and contraction, by a single operation.
The main goal of this work is to present a language that is capable of achieving the
above mentioned and to develop a logic based on this language. We will prove soundness
and completeness of the logic using a semantic approach. Although we will not provide
an axiomatization of a deductive system, we give some results obtained in the attempt to
nd one.
We will also present a Prolog implementation of the logic developed. It will be based
on the semantic approach. This implementation will allow to test properties of the logic
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as well as mechanisms of the belief revision framework.
Viewing things from dierent angles often allows deeper insight into the mechanisms
that lie behind them. That is why we will investigate the belief revision framework
introduced above from the perspective of an argumentation framework.
We hope that this work will contribute to the research eld of knowledge representation
and especially to the relatively young research in rejection and disbelief.
1.4 Structure of this work
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows:
In this section, we continue to introduce some the main elds of research our paper
touches briey. Section 2 introduces the extended language and lists desirable properties
of the logic. Soundness and completeness of the proof theory are shown in Section 3.
Section 4 provides information about the two implementation approaches. In Section 5
we continue to illustrate properties of the logic of disbelief and take some steps towards
its axiomatization . A transformation of the belief revision framework introduced in the
motivation into an argumentation framework is given in Section 6. Section 7 concludes
with a summary of the results and with aspects of further work.
1.5 Logics of Disbelief
Many logics have been developed in order to increase the expressibility of classical propo-
sitional logic which does not suce for some purposes, or to capture decidable fragments
of rst or second order logic which in many cases are too general. Logics have been de-
vised to capture notions of modalities like "it is known", "it is necessary", "it is possible",
or notions of time. Other logics have been developed in order to be able to talk about
objects and their relationships, to reason about points or regions in space, to reason about
actions, etc.
Usually these logics are based on the idea that a set of propositions is assumed to be
true and that the question is what can be inferred from them, i.e. what else is true if
some premises hold. The question of what is not believed to hold and of inferring from
that what else should be rejected is mostly neglected or reduced to classical negation.
Like contraction in belief revision, rejection in logic has seldom been seen as a primitive
concept.
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However, there are some approaches which attempt to overcome this shortcoming.
They usually expand the formalism by a set of propositions dual to the classical ap-
proaches. Besides a set of propositions that are assumed to be true, i.e. believed, they
consider another one with propositions that are disbelieved or rejected. A consequence
relation is then dened which does not only handle inferences from the set of beliefs but
also inferences from the set of disbeliefs or even from both sets. This can result in new
beliefs and new disbeliefs.
In some cases the two sets are only connected via a notion of inconsistency, i.e. in-
ference is done separately on every set and then a consistency condition is checked  for
example, that no proposition is included in both sets. In other cases, the consequence
relation considers both sets, i.e. there is interaction between beliefs and disbeliefs.
Another issue that motivated the consideration of disbeliefs was the desire to model
contraction explicitly. To illustrate this we want to adopt an example given in [2].
Example 5. An ignorant agent revises its belief base with a! b, then contracts b, then
revises with a. If the revision framework does not allow the explicit representation of
disbeliefs there is only one possible result  the agent's belief set contains fa; a! bg. As
b was not in the belief set when the contraction was executed, nothing changed and then
the contraction was forgotten.
If contraction was modelled in terms of disbeliefs denoted b for the disbelief in b, other
beliefs sets would be possible. Depending on the order on the propositions,

b; a! b
	
and

a; b
	
would be acceptable outcomes of the above revision sequence as well.
1.6 Many-valued Logics
Considerations about logics with more than two truth values go back at least to Aristotle
who discussed how to evaluate propositions talking about the future. The answer to this
is closely related to the philosophical question of whether future events are already deter-
mined. One possible but not inescapable way of dealing logically with nondeterminism is
to discard the principle of the excluded middle and interpret a third value as "possible"
or "undened".
The works of Lukasiewicz and Post in the 1920s stand at the beginning of many-
valued logics as a separate research area. Important early results were the axiomatization
of Lukasiewicz' three-valued logic and its expansion to a truth functional complete logic.
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However, numerous other logics have been devised and investigated.
In general, many-valued logics are similar to classical propositional logic in that they
obey the principle of truth functionality, i.e. the value of a proposition is uniquely deter-
mined by the value of its components. There is no standard interpretation for the truth
values, but usually there are values 0 and 1 that correspond to true and false in standard
propositional logic. If reduced to these two values, most many-valued logics behave like
the classical one. The interpretation of the truth values depends on the domain for which
the logic is used.
In many cases the truth values are a nite or innite set of rational or real numbers
in the interval [0; 1] and the connectives are dened in terms of mathematical functions
usually including the minimum and maximum of a set.
Many-valued logics are applied in linguistics, logic, philosophy, hardware design, and
mathematics. Probably most successful in application is the theory of fuzzy sets and
the resulting fuzzy logic, which is often used for reasoning with uncertainty, i.e. vague
information.
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2 The language of disbelief and basics of its logic
2.1 Syntax of the language
We extend the language of propositional logic L
p
by introducing the unary connective
bar, which denotes the disbelief in the proposition below it, i.e. ' denotes the disbelief
in '.
Denition 2.1. A set L is a language of disbelief if it is the smallest set satisfying the
following properties.
(i) The propositional letters a; a
1
; a
2
; : : : ; b; b
1
; : : : are elements of L.
(ii) If ' 2 L and  2 L, then (' ^  ) 2 L, (' _  ) 2 L, ('!  ) 2 L, (:') 2 L and
' 2 L.
Example 6.
 (a ^ b),
 
a _ b

, (a! b) are elements of L.
 (a ^ _b), (a!b), (a (:^) b) are not elements of L.
In the remainder of this paper, we will often simplify notation by omitting parentheses
if doing so does not cause ambiguity.
Remark 7. In contrast to the logics introduced in [2], we allow the nesting of the disbelief
bar. The language considered in this paper is restricted to elements ' and ', where ' is
a classical proposition. As seen in Example 6, our language contains sentences of a more
general structure.
It is possible to think of the connective bar as a second type of negation. However, it
will be seen that its behavior makes the logic a lot more complicated.
Denition 2.2. Let L be a language of disbelief. An element ' of L is called a disbelief
if its main connective is the unary connective bar. Otherwise it is called a belief. All
elements of L are called propositions.
2.2 Remarks on desirable properties of the logic
We want to keep as many properties of classical logic as possible. That is why we do
not want any proposition of the form ' ^ :' to have a model. That is, any superset of
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{'; :'} is inconsistent. The same should hold for a proposition and the disbelief in it,
i.e. ' ^ ' and therefore {'; '} is not to be satisable. This corresponds to the intuition
that believing and disbelieving in the same thing at the same time is inconsistent.
In order to be able to express agnosticism, we want our framework to have models for
propositions that denote the disbelief in a proposition and at the same time the disbelief
in its negation. That is, in contrast to :' ^ ::', ' ^ :' should be consistent and
therefore should have a model. The intuitive reading is that information concerning ' is
rejected. If that was not possible, disbelief would break down to something very similar
to classical negation.
In order to capture this notion with models satisfying a set of propositions includ-
ing disbeliefs, we propose to use a three-valued logic with the values true denoted by 1
(proposition believed), false denoted by 0 (negation of proposition believed), undened
denoted by u.
We want to back up this proposal with the following example. Consider the proposition
' ^ :' and a two-valued logic, i.e. one in which every propositional variable is assigned
either 0 or 1. As required above, the proposition should have a model, i.e. there should
be an assignment that evaluates it to 1. For now, we further assume that an intuitive
conjunction is evaluated to 1 if and only if all its conjuncts are evaluated to 1 as well.
This assumption is all the more natural because we consider a two-valued logic. Since
' ^ :' is to be true ' and :' must take the value 1. Now it becomes obvious that any
assignment to ' causes a problem. Assigning 1 to ' results in trying to satisfy {'; '},
which we demanded not to be possible. The same problem arises with the assignment
of 0 to ', which is equivalent to assigning 1 to :'. Now we would be forced to satisfy
{:'; :'}. Consequently, a third value appears necessary which ' has to take if ' ^ :'
is to be evaluated to true.
It seems to be a reasonable demand that :' be a logical consequence of ', i.e. that
an assignment of 1 to ' implies an assignment of 1 to :'. This would correspond to the
intuition that if ' is believed its negation cannot be believed, so it is disbelieved. Using
substitution, contraposition, and elimination of double negation, we get the following
implications:
 ' implies :'
 :' implies '
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 ::' implies :'
 :' implies '
Thinking back to the motivation, we did not just want to be able to model con-
traction, but also to undo it again if necessary. It is not enough to have blockers that
keep propositions from being introduced into the belief set, we also need blockers for the
blockers.
It is natural that if ' is a blocker for ', ' should be the one for '.
Example 8.

0
= (: : :)

1
= (: : :)  ' ^ :'

2
= (: : : ; ' ^ :')  ' ^ :'

2
=
 
: : : ; ' ^ :'; ' ^ :'

Now consider Example 8 . It sketches parts of a possible development in the belief
revision framework. Obviously, the underlying logic is a logic of disbelief.
We have an initial belief state 
0
. Then ' and its negation are simultaneously con-
tracted by introducing their corresponding disbeliefs. This could have been done in two
separate revision steps as well. ' as well as its negation are now blocked from being
introduced into the belief set, i.e. an assignment of the truth value u to ' is forced.
Then this contraction of information about ' is undone by blocking it via ' ^ :'
2
.
Intuitively, whatever the value of ' was in 
0
, it should be the same as induced by 
2
.
However, this is not the case. Believing ' conicts with :'. That is because ' implies
:' which is inconsistent with :'. Likewise, :' conicts with ', as :' implies '. In
consequence, ' is still restricted to the value u, which is counterintuitive. This undesirable
property is caused by the fact that the implication "' implies :'" creates interaction
between propositions and the blockers of their blockers. Thereby, we have shown that
the demand for :' to be a logical consequence of ' is not reasonable considering our
purposes. Interaction should be restricted to propositions and disbeliefs one order higher.
2
Note that ' ^ :' would not necessarily achieve the same, as this would demand only one of the two
blockers to be removed.
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Demanding, in contrast, that if ' is assigned 1, :' is to be assigned u, solves the
problem only partially. This would mean that the intuitively rational proposition :'^'
would not be satisable, which is just as counterintuitive.
The implication "if ' is assigned 1, then :' is assigned 1 as well" is not desirable,
either. Consider
 
'!  

^ . This proposition obviously implies :'. Certainly, if  was
true, ' should not be, but jumping to the conclusion that its negation must hold is too
strong a demand  assigning u to ' intuitively is just as right.
The way out of this dilemma is to refrain from restricting ' to one single value if one
value is given for '. This breaks the principle of extensionality. The value of a proposition
is no longer determined by the value assigned to the propositional variables it contains.
The disbelief operator is not truth functional.
2.3 Truth Tables for the classical connectives
As noted above, our logic will be a three-valued one. So we have to extend the truth
tables for all the connectives to the third value undened. Again, we will give an intuitive
justication for our choice rather than a strictly formal one.
Interpreting u as: there is no information about the value, it might be true, it might
be false, it might be neither; we arrive at the following denitions for the connectives.
The truth value of a conjunction ' ^  should be the same as in the classical case
when the only values involved are 0 and 1. If ' is 0, the conjunction can only be 0 too.
Even if, later on, the value of  turns out to be true, this does not change anything. If '
is 1, the value of the conjunction depends heavily on  . For 0 and 1, the case is clear, as
mentioned above; but what if  is u? We think that in this case the conjunction should
be evaluated to u as well. Depending on the future value of  , it can change to 0 or 1, so
it is undened until the value is known. These considerations are symmetric, of course.
Similar considerations apply to the disjunction ' _  . If ' is 1, the disjunction is
evaluated to 1 too. If ' it is 0, however, its value depends on  only. And in case of  
being u, the value of the disjunction should be undened as well, since a future value of
 might make it true or false.
By intuitive considerations, we have thus arrived at Lukasiewicz's denitions for weak
conjunction and disjunction of a three-valued logic. The negation is quite obvious, as
well. Using similar argumentation as above, the value of a negated u remains undened.
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' ^  0 u 1
0 0 0 0
u 0 u u
1 0 u 1
' :'
0 1
u u
1 0
' _  0 u 1
0 0 u 1
u u u 1
1 1 1 1
'!  0 u 1
0 1 1 1
u u 1 1
1 0 u 1
'$  0 u 1
0 1 u 0
u u 1 u
1 0 u 1
Table 1: Truth Tables for classical connectives
The denition for the implication '!  is not quite as straightforward, though. If it
is dened in terms of negation and disjunction, as in the classical case, its value would be
u given that ' and  are evaluated to u. Intuitively, that makes perfect sense, because,
depending on the future values of the propositions, the implication could take any value.
If we do that, however, there will be no tautologies in our logic, which can easily be
seen by assigning u to every propositional variable and disbelief  which would cause every
proposition to be evaluated to u. Therefore, we use a separate denition for implication.
It diers from the intuitively right one in that it evaluates the implication not to u but to
1 if ' and  are assigned u. This means that implication and disjunction are no longer
interdenable via negation.
We further dene '$  as ('!  ) ^ ( ! '). This corresponds to the notion that
two propositions are equivalent if they are evaluated to the same value under all truth
assignments.
Table 1 summarizes our denition of the classical connectives.
Remark 9. We are aware of the fact that the implication as we dened it has semantical
shortcomings. When using the logic in an application, though, it will always be possible
to fall back on negation and disjunction to capture the other notion of implication.
2.4 Laws of the classical connectives
Using the above denitions, many of the properties of the connectives still hold. Two of
the rules that do not hold any more are ' ^ :' = ? and ' _ :' = >. They basically
represent the principle of the excluded middle, so it is not surprising that we cannot use
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them any longer as we explicitly allow a third value.
The following rules can be used to transform propositions syntactically without chang-
ing their truth value. Consequently, these rules can be used to characterize the equivalence
relation between propositions later on.
Proposition 2.3. The following equations hold.
Associativity (' ^  ) ^  = ' ^ ( ^ ) (' _  ) _  = ' _ ( _ )
Commutativity ' ^  =  ^ ' ' _  =  _ '
Distributivity (' _  ) ^  = ' ^  _  ^  (' ^  ) _  = (' _ ) ^ ( _ )
Absorption ' ^ (' _  ) = ' ' _ (' ^  ) = '
Idempotency ' ^ ' = ' ' _ ' = '
de Morgan : (' ^  ) = :' _ : : (' _  ) = :' ^ : 
Double negation ::' = '
Laws for ? and > ' ^ > = ' ' _ > = >
' ^ ? = ? ' _ ? = '
Proof. We show the validity of two of these equations by calculating the truth value of
the proposition given assignments of their atomic components. In order to save space, we
write all values of  in one row.
'   (' _  ) ^  ' ^  _  ^  : (' ^  ) :' _ : 
0 0 0u1 000 000 1 1
0 u 0u1 0uu 0uu 1 1
0 1 0u1 0u1 0u1 1 1
u 0 0u1 0uu 0uu 1 1
u u 0u1 0uu 0uu u u
u 1 0u1 0u1 0u1 u u
1 0 0u1 0u1 0u1 1 1
1 u 0u1 0u1 0u1 u u
1 1 0u1 0u1 0u1 0 0
The rest of the equations can be veried analogously using truth tables.
Using the de Morgan rules, conjunction and disjunction are interdenable. So we
would not restrict the expressibility of our language by omitting either conjunction or
disjunction.
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'
0 u 1
0 a b c
' u d e f
1 g h i
Table 2: Possible constellations of a proposition and the disbelief in it
2.5 Restrictions to the connective bar
In Section 2.2, we have seen that determining the value of a disbelief ' by the value
assigned to ' does not work, but still a proposition and the disbelief in it are not in-
dependent of each other. What then is their relationship - which constellations of truth
assignments should be possible?
Table 2 shows all the combinations between a proposition and the disbelief in it. It is
clear that the combination i must not be allowed because belief in a proposition and, at
the same time, disbelief in it would contradict the purpose of the disbelief framework. In
fact, it was our starting point in Section 2.2 that this combination was to be inconsistent.
Combinations c and g should be allowed as they correspond to our intuition. Combi-
nations d and f must be allowed, in order not to cause the counterintuitive results of the
implications discussed in the context of Example 8.
The combinations b, e and h should be allowed as well. Whenever we have no denite
information about one side, all should be possible for the other.
Combination a is a dicult case, though. We propose not to allow it. On the one
hand, allowing it would mean that there is no distinction between assigning 0 or u to
a disbelief. On the other, not allowing it would mean that :' ^ ::' implies that ' is
assigned u which corresponds to the intuition, because the proposition reads: it is not the
case that ' is disbelieved (evaluation of ' to true is favoured) and it is not the case that
:' is disbelieved (evaluation of ' to false is favoured), so an assignment to u is the only
reasonable compromise.
Remark 10. The table for ' and :' can be constructed from this one by substituting :'
for ' and then interchanging the left and the right column, thereby undoing the negation
of '.
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'
0 u 1
0 - + +
' u + + +
1 + + -
'
0 u 1
0 + + -
:' u + + +
1 - + +
Table 3: Valid constellations for a proposition and the disbelief in it
Table 3 shows the possible constellations of ' and '  "+" denoting allowed, "-"
denoting not allowed.
Remark 11. Note that ' and ' are independent of each other. All constellations between
the two are possible as u can be assigned to '.
2.6 Truth assignment and valuation
There have been several approaches to a denition of truth assignment and valuation.
One of the goals was to keep the structure of the models as simple as possible. Obviously
it will not work to assign values to the propositional letters alone, since the connective
"disbelief" is not truth functional.
One approach was based on the idea of simplifying all propositions via de Morgan-like
rules. There would have been a denition that ' ^  is equivalent to ' _  and ' _  to
' ^  . This would have allowed a simplication to atomic disbeliefs. These rules would
have been sound as the propositions would allow the same truth values for ' ^  and
' _  etc. given assignments to ' and  
3
. There is no justied simplication for the
disbelief in an implication, however, which is why this approach was abandoned.
The approach we nally chose combines an assignment with a consistency condition.
Denition 2.4. Let L be a language of disbelief. A truth assignment A is a function that
assigns a unique truth value A () ; A (') 2 f0; u; 1g to each propositional letter  2 L
and to each disbelief ' 2 L.
Let A be a truth assignment. A truth valuation V
A
is a function that assigns a unique
truth value V
A
(') to each proposition ' 2 L, such that V
A
( ) = A ( ) for all proposi-
tional letters and disbeliefs  and the value of a compound proposition is determined in
3
But only when using the combinations dened in Table 3. Other constellations would not have had
this property.
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accordance with the truth tables (Table 1) from section 2.3.
Proposition 2.5. Applying Denintion 2.4, a truth valuation V
A
is uniquely determined
by the truth assignment A, i.e. there are no V
1
A
and V
2
A
such that V
1
A
(') 6= V
2
A
(') for any
'.
Proof. Assume there is a truth assignment A that gives rise to two truth valuations V
1
A
and V
2
A
such that V
1
A
(') 6= V
2
A
(') for a particular '. By induction on the structure of ',
we continue this argument, ending in a contradiction and thereby proving the proposition.
 ' is a propositional letter. V
1
A
(') 6= V
2
A
('). Consequently A (') = v
1
and
A (') = v
2
and v
1
6= v
2
. A is not a truth assignment.
 ' is a disbelief. V
1
A
(') 6= V
2
A
('). Consequently A (') = v
1
and A (') = v
2
and
v
1
6= v
2
. A is not a truth assignment.
These two are the initial cases that end an induction and, as can easily be seen, they
contradict the assumption that A is a truth assignment.
 ' is syntactically equivalent to : . V
1
A
(: ) 6= V
2
A
(: ). Consequently
V
1
A
( ) 6= V
2
A
( ). Inductively apply the proof.
 ' is syntactically equivalent to '
1
Æ '
2
, where Æ 2 f^;_;!g.
V
1
A
('
1
Æ '
2
) 6= V
2
A
('
1
Æ '
2
). Consequently V
1
A
('
1
) 6= V
2
A
('
1
) or V
1
A
('
2
) 6= V
2
A
('
2
).
Inductively apply the proof.
Example 12. (i) A (a) = 1; A (a) = 1 is a truth assignment, but it contradicts our notion
of disbelief.
(ii) A
 
a! b

= 1; A (a) = u;A (b) = u like (i).
(iii) A (a) = 1; A (a ^ a) = u is a truth assignment, but our intention demands that
"equivalent" formulae should be evaluated to the same truth value.
Example 12 illustrates that Denition 2.4 is not yet sucient. It is shown that some
truth assignments  and the truth valuations they give rise to  satisfy the denition but
are still inconsistent with respect to the intuition we are trying to capture. This is due
to the fact that the denition considers the truth tables for the classical connectives, but
the value restrictions that come with the disbelief bar are not yet taken care of.
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Example 12 (ii) makes clear why dealing with the value restrictions at the level of
dening the truth assignment is very hard. In order to realize that the assignment is in
some way inconsistent, the value for compound propositions has to be calculated.
Example 12 (iii) causes an additional dilemma. Usually equivalence of propositions is
dened in terms of truth valuations, but now we need equivalence in order to dene truth
valuations. Tableau proofs introduced in Section 3 will provide a tool for determining
which propositions are equivalent.
Our suggestion for dealing with these problems is to calculate the truth valuations of
all possible truth assignments. We can then check which truth assignments give rise to
truth valuations containing inconsistencies shown above and leave those out of further
consideration.
Denition 2.6. A truth valuation V
A
as dened in denition 2.4 is valid if there is no
proposition ' such that one of the following holds:
(1) V
A
(') = 1 and V
A
(') = 1
(2) V
A
(') = 0 and V
A
(') = 0
(3) V
A
(') = 1 and V
A
(:') = 0
(4) V
A
(') = 0 and V
A
(:') = 1
(5)  
L
' and V
A
 
 

6= V
A
(')
A truth assignment A is valid only if it gives rise to a valid truth valuation.
(1-4) make sure that a valid truth valuation is in accordance with the restrictions
outlined in Section 2.5, (5) captures our intuition that "equivalent" propositions should
be treated in the same way. Note that using equivalence for the denition of truth
valuations leads to a somewhat circular denition of both. However, as will be seen later,
this circle is broken by the use of tableaux.
Remark 13. There is no valid truth assignment such that V
 
>

= 1: Follows immedi-
ately from Denition 2.6 (property 1).
Remark 13 shows that disbelieving in a tautology is not consistently possible in our
framework. We think this to be a nice property. A similar one holds for contradictions:
V
 
?

= 0 is not permitted.
The distinction between truth assignment and valid truth assignment is essential. Only
valid truth assignments give rise to what we want to be models of a proposition. Nonvalid
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truth assignments have an inconsistency built in and are therefore of no interest. In the
remainder we will consider only valid truth assignments and omit the word valid.
We dene the consequence relation between a set of propositions and a proposition in
accordance with the classical notion.
Denition 2.7. Let  be a set of propositions. We say that ' is a consequence of ,
denoted  j= ', if for any truth valuation V ,
8 ( 2  ^ V ( ) = 1) implies V (') = 1.
We also dene equivalence in the traditional way.
Denition 2.8. Two propositions ' and  are equivalent, ' 
L
 , if and only if for all
truth assignments A: V
A
(') = V
A
( ).
Proposition 2.9. If the proposition  does not contain the disbelief operator, ' 6  for
any '.
Proof. (Sketch) It suces to show the existence of a truth assignment that leads to an
evaluation of  and ' to dierent truth values.
As  does not contain a disbelief bar, its value is determined by the assignment to the
propositional letters alone. As a starting point, we chose the assignment that assigns the
value u to every propositional letter and disbelief. Further, we we leave the assignment
xed for the propositional letters, i.e. the value of  is not going to change during the
following considerations.
If the value of  is 1 or 0, we already have the desired assignment. So the only case
that remains to be considered is when  takes the value u. And depending on the value
of ', the desired assignment can be constructed by chosing ' to be 1 or 0.
3 TABLEAU PROOFS IN THE LOGIC OF DISBELIEF 20
3 Tableau proofs in the logic of disbelief
Axiomatizations for many-valued logics are often dicult. Semantic characterizations of
the relations that are of interest are usually easier to nd. The same holds for soundness
and completeness proofs, in many cases.
The main aspect and a source of complexity of our disbelief logic lies in the compat-
ibility of several truth assignments to ' and ', e.g. the possibility of believing :' and
at the same time not committing to disbelief in ' (evaluating ' to u), as well as in the
nesting of the disbelief bar. However, the specications made in Sections 2.3, 2.5 can be
captured elegantly with tableaux and a model-checking framework using tableau rules,
which we want to present in the following. Denitions, lemmas and theorems 3.1 - 3.8 are
adapted from [9].
3.1 Atomic tableaux and denitions
First we explain our notation. An atomic tableau is a tree with a root entry ' : v
0
and
n leaves with the entries c
1
: : : c
n
. In our case, n will be 1, 2 or 3. Every c
i
is a possibly
empty list of signed propositions ( 
i1
: v
i1
; :::;  
in
: v
in
). ';  
i1
; :::;  
in
are propositions
of a language of disbelief and v
0
; :::; v
in
are members of f0; u; 1; < 1; > 0g which represent
value restrictions. <1 and >0 are abbreviations for f0; ug and fu; 1g as will become clear
from the rules (t1) and (t2) in Figure 2.
' : 1 ' : u ' : 0 ' :< 1 ' :> 0
(r1) (r2) (r3) (r4) (r5)
Figure 1: Valid roots of a tableau
Figure 1 shows which entries are allowed at the root of a tableau.
' :< 1
' : 0
uuuuuuuuu
' : u
IIIIIIIII
' :> 0
' : u
uuuuuuuuu
' : 1
IIIIIIIII
(t1) (t2)
Figure 2: Abbreviations
The atomic tableaux (t1) and (t2) in Figure 2 dene the meaning of the abbreviations.
If ' is restricted to a value less than 1, it can take the values 0 or u. The case of a restriction
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to a value greater than 0 is analogous.
:' : 1
' : 0
:' : u
' : u
:' : 0
' : 1
(t3) (t4) (t5)
' ^  : 1
' : 1;  : 1
' ^  : u
' : u;  : u
rrrrrrrrrr
' : u;  : 1 ' : 1;  : u
KKKKKKKKKK
' ^  : 0
' : 0

 : 0
???????
(t6) (t7) (t8)
' _  : 1
' : 1

 : 1
???????
' _  : u
' : u;  : u
rrrrrrrrrr
' : u;  : 0 ' : 0;  : u
LLLLLLLLLL
' _  : 0
' : 0;  : 0
(t9) (t10) (t11)
'!  : 1
' : 0
yyyyyyyy
 : 1 ' : u;  : u
KKKKKKKKKK
'!  : u
' : 1;  : u
uuuuuuuuu
' : u;  : 0
IIIIIIIII
'!  : 0
' : 1;  : 0
(t12) (t13) (t14)
' : 1
' : u

' : 0
777777
' : u
' : 0

' : u
' : 1
=======
' : 0
' : u

' : 1
777777
(t15) (t16) (t17)
Figure 3: Atomic tableaux for the connectives
The atomic tableaux in Figure 3 precisely encode the truth tables presented in Section
2.3 and the restrictions caused by the disbelief bar presented in Section 2.5. (t1-17)
represent the atomic tableaux.
The basic idea behind the tableau approach is to create a model  or to show that
no model exists. Starting with an initial goal, all possible paths of achieving this goal
are tried. Sometimes there is only one path, like in (t6). Sometimes there are dierent
possibilities, like in (t9). In these cases all of the paths have to be investigated separately.
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Arriving at an inconsistency on one path tells us that chosing it was not successful.
If none of the paths are successful, the initial goal cannot be achieved. A consistent path
that cannot be expanded further gives us a solution for the initial goal.
Now the notions of what a path is, of how we dene inconsistency, of when a path
cannot be expanded further have to be dened more formally.
Denition 3.1. A nite tableau is a binary tree, labelled with signed propositions called
entries, that satises the following inductive denition:
(i) All atomic tableaux are nite tableaux.
(ii) If T is a nite tableau, P a path on T; E an entry on P and T
0
is obtained from T
by adjoining the unique atomic tableau with root entry E at the end of the path P; then
T
0
is also a nite tableau.
If T
0
; T
1
; :::; T
n
; ::: is a sequence of nite tableaux, such that, for each n  0, T
n+1
is
constructed from T
n
by an application of (ii), then T =
S
T
n
is a tableau.
Remark 14. Some of the atomic tableaux are in fact not binary but ternary. This is
to represent the third value more naturally and improve readability. It should be clear,
though, that those can be easily transformed to be binary trees.
Denition 3.2. Let T be a tableau, P a path on T and E an entry occuring on P:
(i) E has been reduced on P if all entries on one path through the atomic tableau with
root E occur on P:
(ii) P is contradictory
4
if
(1) for some proposition ',
' : 0 and ' : 1,
' : 0 and ' : u, or
' : u and ' : 1 are both entries on P , or
(2) for two propositions ' and  with ' 
L
 , ' : v
1
and  : v
2
are entries on P
such that v
1
6= v
2
.
(iii)P is nished if it is contradictory or every entry on P is reduced on P:
(iv) T is nished if every path through T is nished.
(v) T is contradictory if every path through T is contradictory.
4
We will sometimes say "the branch is closed" instead of "the branch is contradictory" and "open"
instead of "noncontradictory".
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Remark 15. Condition (2) of Denition 3.2 is an essential dierence compared to a
normal tableau. See section 3.3 for an explanation that equivalence can be dened in
terms of tableau proofs in spite of this condition, which seems to make the denition
circular.
Example 16. 
' ^ ( _ ) : 1
' : 1;  _  : 1
 _  : 1 is not reduced on the only path P in this tableau, as not all entries of
a path through the atomic tableau with root entry  _  : 1 occur on P . So the
tableau is not nished.

' ^ ( _ ) : 1
' : 1;  _  : 1
 : 1
 _  : 1 is reduced on the only path P in this tableau, as all entries of a path
through the atomic tableau with root entry  _ : 1 occur on P . So this tableau is
nished.

('
1
^ '
2
) ^ ( _ ) : 1
'
1
^ '
2
: 1;  _  : 1
 : 1
jjjjjjjjjjjjjjjjj
 : 1
RRRRRRRRRRRRRR
'
1
: 1; '
2
: 1
 _ : 1 is reduced in the tableau, as on every single path, we nd all the entries of
a path through the atomic tableau with root entry  _  : 1. '
1
^ '
2
: 1 is reduced
on the left path of the tableau, but not on the right one. Therefore the tableau is
not nished.
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
' ^ :' : 1
' : 1;:' : 1
' : 0
This tableau is nished, as all entries are reduced on all paths. Furthermore it is
contradictory, as its only path is contradictory. The path is contradictory, because
there are two entries that demand one and the same proposition to have dierent
values.

(' ^ :') _  : 1
' ^ :' : 1
lllllllllllll
 : 1
OOOOOOOOOOOO
' : 1;:' : 1
' : 0
This tableau is nished but not contradictory, as it has a nonclosed branch.
Denition 3.3. A tableau proof of a proposition ' is a contradictory tableau with root
entry ' :< 1. A proposition is tableau provable, written `
t
', if it has a tableau proof.
A tableau refutation for a proposition ' is a contradictory tableau starting with ' :> 0.
A proposition is tableau refutable if it has a tableau refutation.
a! a :< 1
a! a : u
ggggggggggggggggggggggg
a! a : 0
PPPPPPPPPPPP
a : 1; a : u
oooooooooooo
a : u; a : 0
OOOOOOOOOOOO
a : 1; a : 0
Figure 4: Example Proof
Example 17. Figure 4 is a tableau proof for a! a.
It is clear that open branches in a nished tableau represent possible models for the
propositions at the root of the tableau. Hence satisability of ' can be checked with a
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tableau with root entry ' : 1. If all branches are closed it is not satisable, if there is an
open branch, it is.
It can be shown, that the proof for a proposition is always nite.
Theorem 3.4. There is a nished nite tableau T for each possible root entry ' :< 1.
Proof. In fact we prove that any nished tableau with a root entry corresponding to
(r1) - (r3) is nite. The theorem then follows, because corresponding to (t1) we can
combine the nite nished tableaux ' : 0 and ' : u with the root entry ' :< 1 to get a
nished tableau that is still nite.
We proceed by induction on the structure of the given proposition '. If ' is a proposi-
tional letter, then the tableau consisting of just the signed propositional letter is nished.
Note that signed propositional letters are themselves atomic tableaux.
For the inductive case consider (t8) ' ^  : 0. By induction there are nished nite
tableaux T
'
and T
 
with root entries ' : 0 and  : 0 respectively. We form the desired
tableau with root entry ' ^  : 0 by beginning with the corresponding tableau (t8) and
then appending copies of T
'
and T
 
below the entries ' : 0 and  : 0 respectively. It is
immediate from the denition of a nished tableau that this gives us the desired result.
Next consider (t6) ' ^  : 1. As before, we have nished nite tableaux T
'
and T
 
.
We begin our desired tableau T with the appropriate atomic tableau (t6). To the end of
this tableau we add a copy of T
'
to get a tableau T
0
in which the only possible occurence
of an entry is that of  : 1 in the original atomic tableau. We now add a copy of T
 
to
the end of every noncontradictory path in T
0
to get our desired T .
The other cases are treated similarily.
3.2 Soundness and completeness
Theorem 3.5. (Soundness) If ' is tableau provable, then ' is valid, i.e. `
t
' implies
j=
L
'.
Proof. Applying contraposition, suppose ' is not valid. By denition there is a truth
valuation V assigning 0 or u to '. We say that the valuation V agrees with a signed
proposition E, if
(1) E is ' : 1 and V (') = 1,
(2) E is ' : u and V (') = u, or
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(3) E is ' : 0 and V (') = 0.
We show (Lemma 3.6) that if any valuation V agrees with the root node of a tableau,
then there is a path P in the tableau such that V agrees with every entry on P . As no
valuation can agree with any path on a contradictory tableau, there can be no tableau
proof for '.
Lemma 3.6. If V is a valuation that agrees with the root entry of a given tableau T , then
T has a path P every entry of which agrees with V .
Proof. We prove by induction that there is a sequence (P
n
) such that, for every n, P
n
is
contained in P
n+1
and P
n
is a path through T
n
such that V agrees with every entry on
P
n
. The desired path P through T will then simply be the union of the P
n
. The initial
case of the induction is easily seen to be true by the assumption that V agrees with the
root of T . It is easy to verify that the atomic tableaux precisely capture the truth tables
and value restrictions for the disbelief bar, so that V has to agree with one of the paths
the tableau branches into (otherwise it would not be a valid truth valuation).
For the induction step, suppose we have constructed a path P
n
in T
n
every entry of
which agrees with V . If we get T
n+1
from T
n
without extending P
n
, then we let P
n+1
= P
n
.
If P
n
is extended in T
n+1
, then it is extended by adding to its end an atomic tableau with
root E for some entry E appearing on P
n
. As it is known by induction that V agrees
with E, the same analysis as used in the initial case shows that V agrees with one ot the
extensions of P
n
to a path P
n+1
in T
n+1
.
Lemma 3.7. Let P be a noncontradictory path of a nished tableau T . Dene a truth
assignment A on all propositional letters a and disbeliefs '
5
as follows:
If a : 1 is an entry on P then A (a)
def
=1.
If a : u is an entry on P then A (a)
def
=u.
If a : 0 is an entry on P then A (a)
def
=0.
If ' : 1 is an entry on P then A (')
def
=1.
If ' : u is an entry on P then A (')
def
=u.
If ' : 0 is an entry on P then A (')
def
=0.
For all other propositional letters and disbeliefs dene A ()
def
=u.
5
As all paths where disbeliefs in equivalent propositions are evaluated dierently are closed, this truth
assignment will be valid.
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Let V
A
be the valuation the truth assignment A gives rise to (Denitions 2.4, 2.6),
then V
A
agrees with all entries of P .
Proof. We proceed by induction on the structure of propositions on P .
(i) If ' is a propositional letter occuring as (the proposition in) an entry, V
A
agrees
by denition.
(ii) If ' is a disbelief, likewise.
(iii) Suppose (' ^  ) : 1 occurs on the noncontradictory path P . Since T is nished,
both ' : 1 and  : 1 occur on P . By the induction hypothesis V
A
(') = V
A
( ) = 1 , and
so V
A
(' ^  ) = 1 as required.
The remaining connectives and truth values are treated likewise.
Theorem 3.8. (Completeness) If ' is valid, then ' is tableau provable, i.e. j=
L
' implies
`
t
'. In fact, any contradictory tableau with root entry ' :< 1 is a proof of '.
Proof. Suppose that ' is valid and so V (') = 1 for every valuation V . Consider any
nished tableau T with root ' :< 1. If T has a noncontradictory path P , there would be,
by Lemma 3.7, a valuation V that agrees with all its entries and so in particular with ' : u
or ' : 0. This would give us a valuation with V (') 6= 1 contradicting the the validity of
'. Thus every path on T is contradictory and T is a tableau proof of '.
3.3 Remarks
The equivalence between two sentences ' and  can now be checked with a tableau
proof for ('!  ) ^ ( ! '). For all propositions that do not contain a disbelief bar,
condition (2) of Denition 3.2(ii) does not come into play, so the tableau will work just
like a classical one. If there are entries containing disbeliefs that are assigned dierent
values, this condition triggers other equivalence proofs with propositions that contain one
disbelief bar less. As propositions are nite this procedure will terminate and determine
if equivalence holds or not.
As we are in a three-valued logic, there are propositions that are not satisable without
being contradictions, i.e. they are never evaluated to 1 without always being false. A set
of propositions containing one of these does not have a model. We want to be able to
make a distinction between nonsatisable propositions and contradictions as both play an
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Figure 5: Tableau from premises
important role in matters of equivalence and inference. We therefore introduce a symbol
denoting nonsatisability: ?
w
Unlike contradictions, nonsatisable propositions may behave dierently under dier-
ent truth assignments, i.e. although they never take the value 1, they may take the value
u at dierent times.
Example 18. a^:a and a^a are both nonsatisable as can be easily veried, but under
the truth assignment A (a) = u A (a) = 0 the rst is evaluated to u but the second to 0.
That is why we cannot write '  ?
w
for a nonsatisable proposition '. If we did,
equivalence would not be transitive any more. So we write ' `
t
?
w
instead. Without
explicit denition, we assume that this symbol like > and ? is element of the language and
that it is element of Cn () whenever a nonsatisable proposition is element of Cn ().
The tableau scheme provides us with a notion of consequence/inference, as well. Figure
5 illustrates the basic idea. Instead of proving ' to be true under all truth assignments, it
is proved to be true under the assignments that make a set of premises true which captures
the denition of ' being a consequence of these premises.  
i
are the propositions occuring
in .
If the tableau in Figure 5 is contradictory,  `
t
' holds, because it means that in any
open path of a nished tableau for which  
1
: 1; :::;  
n
: 1 hold, ' : 1 has to hold as well.
Soundness and completeness results can be adapted to tableaux with premises.
Proposition 3.9. The deduction theorem
f'g j=  if and only if j= '!  
does not hold.
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Proof. It suces to give a counterexample.
Consider ' ^ ('!  ) j=  . Obviously, this holds. Whenever ' and ' !  are
evaluated to true,  must be true as well. This follows directly from the denition of the
implication.
Under the assignment A (') = u, A ( ) = 0, (' ^ ('!  )) !  evaluates to u
showing that it is not a tautology. Consequently j= (' ^ ('!  ))!  does not hold.
Proposition 3.10. If j= '!  , then f'g j=  holds.
Proof. Follows from the denition of implication. A necessary condition for '!  being
a tautology is that whenever ' takes the truth value 1, so does  . Which is what f'g j=  
states.
There is an intuitive explanation why the deduction theorem does not hold. The left
hand side and the right hand side express dierent things. While the left hand side only
demands that whenever ' is evaluated to 1, so is  , the right hand side requires that the
value of  always be greater than or equal to that of '. In a two-valued logic these two
amount to the same thing, but in a three-valued one, they do not.
Returning to the counterexample used for the proof of Proposition 3.9, the following
can be noted. If the conjunction is split up and the propositions are brought to the right
side as illustrated in Example 19, the resulting implication holds. This can be easily
veried using truth tables.
Example 19.
f'; ('!  )g j=  
f'g j= ('!  )!  
j= '! (('!  )!  )
This principle cannot be used in general, however, as Example 20 illustrates.
Example 20.

' _  ;  _  
	
j= ' _ 

 _  
	
6j= (' _  )! (' _ )
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The assignment A (') = 0; A () = 0; A
 
 

= 1; A ( ) = u makes the rst disjunction
true whithout satisfying the implication. So the consequence relation does not hold.
Taking  _  instead of '_  to the other side rst does not lead to a valid consequence
either. The truth assignment leading to the invalidity is the one given above with the
values of  and  exchangend.
The essence of the above paragraphs is that we can use tautologies that are made up
of implications to derive inference rules, but that this will not give us all necessary rules.
A further investigation of the above relationship seems worthwile and will be necessary if
an axiomatization for the inference relation is to be found.
It was one of our conjectures that
' _   > if and only if '  > or   >;
i.e. that combining two nontautologies via disjunction cannot produce a tautology. How-
ever, this turned out not to be the case. One possible counterexample is
' _
  
 ^  

! :'

.
This is a slight modication of the tautology ' _ :' in the two-valued case, which of
course is not a tautology in our logic as an assignment of u to ' reveals. But actually
this is the only case for which the disjunction is not evaluated to true. So the idea is to
make sure that in this case one of the disjuncts is true without trivially letting it be a
tautology. Once more nonsatisable propositions play an important role. Using one as
the premise in an implication does the trick. As the value of a nonsatisable proposition
never is 1, the second disjunct will be true not only if ' is evaluated to 0 but also for the
truth value u.
The fact that there are nontrivial disjunctions, i.e. disjunctions that cannot be simpli-
ed via ' _>  >, which are tautologies indicates that an axiomatization of tautologies
might be very hard, at least harder than if the above conjecture had held. It also illustrates
the importance of nonsatisable propositions which are not contradictions.
Consequence in our three-valued logic is arguing across branches. Consider the fol-
lowing example: Given is the sentence :' _ '. The (partial) tableau it causes is shown
in Figure 6. It does not allow to draw a denite conclusion about ' as there are open
paths in which ' is assigned 0 but also one where it is assigned u. But it is obvious that
any branch where :' _ ' : 1 and ' : 1 occur will be closed.
So together with ' _  : 1, for example, it would be possible to infer that  holds. In
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:' _ ' : 1
:' : 1
qqqqqqqqqq
' : 1
UUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU
' : 0
' : u
wwwwwwwww
' : 0
GGGGGGGGG
Figure 6: Tableau illustrating inference
the tableau framework, this is easy, but a syntactic axiomatization of inference must be
capable of dealing with such cases as well. An inference across the branches in Figure 6
allows the conclusion that ' cannot be evaluated to true, i.e. that it is nonsatisable. We
think that this nonsatisability must be syntactically expressible in order to fully capture
the inference relation. We present our approach to that in Section 5.
3.4 Truthfunctional completeness
One property that is often of interest is whether all truth assignments can be forced by a
proposition. This property is known as truthfunctional completeness.
It was our conjecture that our logic is not truth functional. The intuitive explanation
is the following. The values true and false do not cause problems, as writing ' or :' does
the job, but in order to force ' to take the value u, ' and :' are needed. Obviously, this
would make it impossible to characterize the assignment A (') = u, A (') = u.
But there is a way of forcing ' to take the value u without having to use disbeliefs 
('! :') ^ (:'! '). This looks a bit awkward, but it works. The only assignment
that satises this proposition is A (') = u.
Of course ' could be a disbelief as well. This should illustrate that the logic of disbelief
allows every truth assignment to be expressed in terms of a proposition.
At this point the question might arise why disbeliefs are necessary at all. Apparently,
a! :a has the same eect as a. Both prevent a from taking the value 1. So why not en-
code every disbelief in this type of implication? But again, the problems arise when think-
ing of disbeliefs in disbeliefs. Using the above scheme a would be (a! :a)! : (a! :a).
This proposition does not have the desired property of being consistent with the evaluation
of a to neither 0 nor u. This notion of disbelief would imply a  a.
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4 Implementations of the logic
4.1 General notes
We present two attempts to implement the logic and its application in the belief revision
framework as Prolog programs
6
. After briey presenting the rst and illustrating why it
failed, we will go more into detail with the second.
The language of disbelief is transferred into Prolog via predicates. Valid propositional
letters are all strings that satisfy the Prolog predicate atomic(). In particular, a; b; c; : : :
can be used as propositional letters for which syntactic and semantic equivalence coincide.
That is, two propositional letters are considered identical if and only if they have the same
syntactic structure.
Recursively dened, valid propositions P are:
P= a, b, c ... | nott(P) | bar(P) | imp(P,P) | con([P,P
+
]) | dis([P,P
+
]
As conjunction and disjunction are associative, we chose not to restrict the corre-
sponding predicates to be binary. Instead, we represented them by a unary predicate that
takes a list of a length greater than one as argument.
Example 21. The following are examples of how elements of the language of disbelief
are translated into the Prolog predicate notation.
 :a becomes nott(a)
 b becomes bar(b)
 a! b becomes imp(a,b)
 a ^ c becomes con([a,c])
 b _ a becomes dis([b,a])
 (a ^ b) ^ c becomes con([a,b,c])
 (a ^ (b! c)) _ :a _ c becomes dis([con([a,imp(b,bar(c))]),bar(dis([nott(a),c]))])
6
Both programs are written for SWI-Prolog. They do not use any fancy features. One of the things
that might cause problems with other Prolog versions is the relation writeln which is used for showing
results to the user. Its occurences would have to be replaced by a corresponding predicate of the Prolog
used.
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As in the framework we base our work on, revision is just appending a proposition to
the sequence, we did not implement revision itself but the identication of the propositions
that make up the belief base. That is, we calculate the consistent subsequence from which
the belief set is built. The procedure which does this reects the denition given in Section
1.2.
Algorithm 4.1.
1. Base=;, Seq=Input Sequence
2. El=last element of Seq
3. TempBase=Base [ El
4. if TempBase consistent then Base=TempBase
5. RemSeq = Seq without the last element
6. if RemSeq empty then goto 7, else Seq = RemSeq and goto 2
7. output TempBase
Starting at the end of the sequence, it is tested whether incorporating the current
proposition into the intermediate belief base creates an inconsistency. If so, the proposition
is discarded, otherwise it is included into the new intermediate belief base.
Of course, the Prolog version of this algorithm looks somewhat dierent, but as both
approaches dier in how the consistency calculation is done, we leave the details to the
respective sections.
4.2 First approach
The main idea of the rst approach was to label all propositions with a number repre-
senting the values the proposition could possibly take. In fact this number represents
one of the subsets of the truth values f0; u; 1g. Using single numbers seemed easier than
labelling with sets.
We used the following mapping: 0={}=inconsistent, 1={0}, 2={u}, 3={1}, 4={0; u},
5={0; 1}, 6={u; 1}, 7={0; u; 1}.
The numbers are interpreted as value restrictions and these are propagated to the
subpropositions. As propositions can occur more than once, all their value restrictions
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are then combined. As the numbers represent sets, the resulting label corresponds to the
intersection of the respective sets. So for example, the result of combining 4 and 5 leaves
1. Furthermore, information contained in the interaction between dierent propositions
is used. This procedure continues until no further changes in the value restrictions occur.
Example 22. We assume that the propositions in the examples are the last ones in the
sequence, so we do not have to consider possible interactions with propositions that have
already been incorporated in the belief base.
 con([a,b]), i.e. a ^ b, is the last proposition of the sequence. Consequently, it is
labelled with 3. As a conjunction can be true only if all its components are true,
this value is propagated to a and b.
 dis([a,b]), i.e. a _ b, is the last proposition of the sequence. Consequently, it is
labelled with 3. As a disjunction can be true if any one of its components is true,
no denite information can be derived about a or b, so both of them are labelled
with 7.
 con([bar(a),dis([b,a])]), i.e. a ^ (b _ a), is the last proposition of the sequence, so a
and b _ a are labelled with 3. From the denition of disbelief it is clear that a can
now only take the truth values u and 0, so a is labelled with 4. As above, the value
restriction of each component of the disjunction is 7.
Obviously, we now have two dierent labels for a: 4 and 7. These are combined to a
single label 4, which represents that a cannot be evaluated to true any more. Seeing
that the disjunction has to be satised and one of its disjuncts cannot be satised
any more, the program knows that the "reduced" disjunction must be satised. In
this case, that is b which consequently is labelled with 3.
Now we have two labels for b  7 and 3  which are combined to 3. This concludes
the calculation.
The investigation of possible interactions between propositions was done using a set
of rules. Example 23 illustrates how this works. In the program, a labelled proposition
is represented by a list that contains the proposition and its label. The propagation of
value restrictions is done on a list of these lists.
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Example 23.
(member([con(X0),1],List1),
member([Y0,Val0],List1),
isrestof(con(X0),Y0),
(Val0=2;Val0=3;Val0=6)),!
-> (getrest(c,X0,Y0,Z0),
dupup([Z0,1],List1,M1),
mtb([con(X0),1],M1,I2));List1=I2)
Assume the list contains a^ b^ c : 1 and c^ a : 6. The rst line checks whether there
is a conjunction in the list that is evaluated to false. This will identify a ^ b ^ c : 1. The
next three lines try to nd a proposition that is a part of this conjunction and that is
restricted to 2, 3 or 6. This will identify c ^ a : 6.
We now have a conjunction that is to be evaluated to false and a part of the conjunc-
tion that cannot be evaluated to false. This means that the remaining part of the rst
conjunction must be false. This is realized in the next two lines. getrest calculates the
rest of the conjunction a ^ b ^ c when c^ a is removed. The result is b. And then the list
of value restrictions is updated (dupup) with the new information that b must be false.
The next predicate causes the initial conjunction to be moved to the back of the list.
This is done because the rule might be applicable to other conjunctions in the list. But
in each run, each rule can be applied only once. The cut forces the rule to be applied
in the rst possible case, so the rst conjunction is moved to give the other candidates a
chance.
The cut is necessary for the following reason. Assume one rule is applicable only once
and assume the next rule is not applicable at all. Since Prolog tries to satisfy as many
predicates as possible it will do backtracking and try another version of the rst rule, but
since there is none and there is no undoing of the backtracking, it will now be assumed
that no rule was applicable. In this case, the value restrictions would not be propagated
correctly.
From the above explanation, it should become obvious how awkward this procedure
really is. The rst intention was not to try out every single truth assignment, but rather
infer the right value restriction based on a set of rules. But the price for preventing this
brute force approach is high. The set of rules that would be necessary is very big and
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complicated  and it is hard to be sure that it can handle every possible case correctly.
Example 24 illustrates a family of the problem cases.
Example 24. Consider the following entry: (a ^ a) _
 
b ^ b

The program does not infer that this disjunction cannot be satised. In order to do
so, it would have to be capable of recognizing the conjunctions to be nonsatisable. But
as it is not forced to try to label one with 3  the value propagated to the conjunctions is
7  it allows the disjunction in the belief base. There are two ways out of this problem:
syntactically recognizing nonsatisability or trying possible truth evaluations.
The rst amounts to an axiomatization of nonsatisable propositions which we have
not been able to give. The second is in opposition to the intention of this approach to
infer rather than to try out.
This is why work on this approach was abandoned. Rather than trying to x the
problems by introducing satisability checks to the already quite complicated procedure,
it seemed reasonable to implement the tableau approach
7
.
4.3 Second approach  Tableau
The second program was written after the tableau idea had matured. Kernel of the
program is the implementation of the tableau procedures introduced in Section 3. As
they cannot deal with general conjunctions and disjunctions, i.e. those with more than
two components, they are normalized. In other words, while the user can omit parentheses
for the two connectives, the program reintroduces them.
The tableaux themselves are not implemented as trees. They are represented as lists
of complete paths. Therefore entries are stored more than once, but checking for clashes
within a list seemed easier than searching within a tree structure.
A tableau entry is a list consisting of a proposition, a truth value, and a ag repre-
senting whether the entry has been reduced. A path is a list of entries and a tableau a
list of paths. There are three special entries  the strings n, open, and closed. They are
used as tags for paths, as to speed up checks, if a path is nished, open, or closed. That
7
In fact, when work on the rst implementation was started, the tableau idea had not been developed
yet. By the time the problems became pressing, work on the tableau denition presented in Section 3
had begun and was quite promising. So a reimplementation seemed more favourable.
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is, once marked as closed, entries on the path are not reduced any more, as this would
not help in creating a consistent model.
When reducing an entry, the respective path is temporarily removed from the tableau.
The atomic tableau that belongs to the entry is identied. If it branches, the path is
duplicated and one of the nodes is inserted into one copy. Finally, the entry is marked as
reduced and the new paths are reinserted into the tableau.
In each run, one entry of every path in the tableau is reduced. The program then
tests whether paths are closed and removes them from the tableau. Finished open paths
are also marked. In some cases, calculation is terminated when an open nished path is
found.
The tableau kernel provides some basic predicates for the user:
 prove(P ) returns "yes" if P is a tautology, "no" otherwise
 satisfiable(P ) returns "yes" if P is satisable, "no" otherwise
 notsatisfiable(P ) returns "yes" if P is nonsatisable, "no" otherwise
 eq(P;Q) returns "yes" if P and Q are equivalent, "no" otherwise
 isconsequenceof(P; [Q

]) returns "yes" if P is a consequence of the set of proposi-
tions
The rst three can have the string show as second argument. In this case, an open
nished path is returned as well. Since a tableau proof for a proposition is a closed
tableau, the open path then gives a model that causes the proposition not to be evaluated
to true. In the case of satisability a model of the proposition is produced. In the case of
nonsatisability, a model is produced as well  proving that there is one.
Algorithm 4.2.
prove(X):- prove(X,A,noshow).
prove(X,show):- prove(X,A,show).
prove(X,A,S):- normalizelist([[X,l]],Y),
maketab(Y,Z),
finishopenfail(Z,A),!,
(S=show -> write\_ln(A);true),
closed(A).
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All the above predicates are similar in appearance to the code shown in Algorithm
4.2. The proof procedure starts by normalizing the proposition. The main task here
is to transform all disjunctions and conjunctions to have exactly two components. The
resulting list is then turned into an initial tableau. The predicate nishopenfail reduces
entries until one open nished path is found or all paths are closed. The cut is necessary
to prevent backtracking. The last line then checks whether the resulting tableau was
closed or contained an open path.
Recall Denition 3.2 of a closed path. The test whether there is a proposition that is
assigned two dierent values is easily realized with a membership check. But to check the
other possibility  that there are two disbeliefs in equivalent propositions with dierent
values  is a little more complicated.
Equivalence checks are expensive because they require a tableau proof for mutual im-
plication. If there are many disbeliefs in the propositions and if the complete equivalence
check was triggered after every reduction of an entry in the tableau, a lot of time would be
wasted on what was known before. That is why equivalence and nonequivalence results
are stored in dynamic predicates that could be interpreted as a database. And before the
tableau proof of equivalence is started, this database is searched, to see whether the check
was run before. This causes a considerable speedup.
Algorithm 4.3.
equivalent(X,X).
eq(X,Y):- equivalent(X,Y),!.
eq(X,Y):- (notequivalent(X,Y),!)->
fail;
((prove(con(imp(X,Y),imp(Y,X))),!) ->
(asserta(equivalent(X,Y)),
asserta(equivalent(Y,X)),
true);
(asserta(notequivalent(X,Y)),
asserta(notequivalent(Y,X)),
fail)
).
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Notes on the revision part of the tableau implementation
In this implementation, there is a clearer separation between the identication of the
belief base and the calculation of the (partial) belief set.
Algorithm 4.4.
8
dorevision(X,R):-belbase(X,R),
createbeliefset(R,S).
belbase(X,Y):-validlist(X),calculate(X,[],Y).
calculate([], Intermediate, Intermediate).
calculate([H|Rest], Intermediate,Y):-
calculate(Rest, Intermediate, Finalresult),
(satisfiablelist([H|Finalresult])->
Y=[H|Finalresult];
Y=Finalresult).
dorevision gets a list of propositions, identies the belief base and creates the belief
set. At rst we are going to look at how the belief base is identied. This is essentially
managed by the predicate calculate.
Its rst argument is the initial sequence of propositions, the second is the intermediate
belief base, the last accumulates the result. calculate([], Intermediate, Intermediate).
denes that in case the sequence is empty, the resulting belief base is equivalent to the
intermediate one.
The rst line in the denition for the nontrivial case causes a recursive call of calculate.
In every recursive step, the rst element of the sequence is cut o, so in the end the list
is empty and the initial case is triggered. Afterwards, one proposition after the other is
appended to the intermediate belief base and it is tested if this list is satisable. If so,
the proposition is inserted into the intermediate belief base, otherwise the latter is left
unchanged. So in the end there is a consistent sequence of propositions.
satisablelist is based on the predicate satisable. In fact the former creates the
conjunction of all the propositions in the list and then triggers the latter.
8
The source code is slightly modied in order to increase readability
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The calculation of the belief set is more interesting than the identication of the belief
base  which should be quite clear after the last section. In fact, only a partial belief set
is calculated as most of the proposition in the innite set do not provide information.
If :a is in the belief set, so is a! ' for any '. But knowing this does not help with
anything. It is our notion that the aim is to derive something about the subpropositions
contained in the belief base. If a _ b is in the belief base, information about which of the
two is true is far more valuable than the fact that any disjunction containing this one is
still true.
So the naive inference engine we implemented does nothing except expanding the
propositions in the belief base to all their subpropositions and checking whether these
are consequences of the base. As the belief base does not change during this procedure,
the nished tableau of the belief base is calculated and reused for the individual checks,
rather than recalculating the entire tableau.
That is, not the predicate isconsequenceof, which has a list of propositions as argument,
is used, but a dierent one that takes a tableau as argument, adds the proposition to be
tested to every nonclosed branch and then continues the reduction of entries.
The very naive way of just considering (all) the subpropositions has some shortcomings.
On the one hand some propositions may occur more than once  not necessarily in the
same syntactic structure. So some checks will be done twice ore even more. Checking the
entire set of subpropositions for duplicates will take much time, as equivalence checks are
involved. This is one point where performance could still be improved.
Disjunctions are another issue. Long disjunctions create many subdisjunctions  two
to the power of the number of disjuncts, to be exact. If one of the short subdisjunctions
turns out to be a consequence of the belief base, all of its longer versions will be in the
belief base, too. But as mentioned above a _ b is not interesting if we already know a.
This could be solved by sorting the subpropositions by length, i.e. by the complexity of
their structure, and test for each disjunction whether one of its disjuncts is already in the
belief base.
One interesting case where the inference "fails" is general resolution. If the proposi-
tions a_ b and c_:b are given, a_ c is not identied as a consequence, simply because it
is not among the subpropositions of the two and therefore not tested. When it is asked
explicitly if a _ c is a consequence, the answer is of course armative. A naive way to
overcome this problem is to create the big disjunction of all the disjunctions in the set of
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base beliefs and consider its subpropositions, which then adds to the problems mentioned
above.
A number of examples illustrating aspects of the usage of the tableau implementation
are found in Appendix C.
Comparing the implementations in size reveals that the (kernel) tableau version is
smaller by far than the other one, which is mainly due to the fact that many inference rules
are necessary to nd out what the tableau reveals by just trying out all the possibilities,
while they still miss to identify certain nonsatisable propositions. The dierence in size
is decreased by the part that does the inference.
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5 Towards an axiomatization
5.1 Equivalence relation 
L
> denotes the tautology, i.e. a proposition that is evaluated to 1 by every truth valuation,
? the contradiction, which is always evaluated to 0. As we are in a three-valued logic,
though, there are propositions that are never evaluated to 1 without being contradictions.
However, this property cannot be used for dening equivalence.
The equivalence relation 
L
for the language of disbelief has many similarities to the
classical one . A major dierence is the set of tautologies. 
L
is a symmetric, transitive
and reexive relation that satises the following properties. The rules for implication are
necessary as it is not denable in terms of disjunction and negation.
' 
L
::'
:' 
L
: if and only if ' 
L
 
'
1

L
'
2
and  
1

L
 
2
implies '
1
!  
1

L
'
2
!  
2
'!  
L
: ! :'
' _ > 
L
>
' ^ > 
L
'
' _ ? 
L
'
' ^ ? 
L
?
'! > 
L
>
> ! ' 
L
'
? ! ' 
L
>
'! ? 
L
:'
:> 
L
?
Furthermore, it satises idempotence, commutativity, associativity and distributivity
of conjunction and disjunction as well as the validity of the de Morgan laws. The above
equivalences directly follow from the properties of the classical connectives given in Section
2.4.
The case when the disbelief bar is involved as the main connective is more interesting.
The fundamental property that should hold in our logic is the following:
' 
L
 if and only if ' 
L
 
The essential denition for this property is Denition 2.6 which characterizes valid
truth assignments. The right to left direction directly follows from the denition, as it
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states that disbeliefs in equivalent propositions have to behave alike, i.e. be equivalent.
The left to right direction is also ensured. To see that, let us examine the identication
of a valid truth assignmnent which could be interpreted as an iterative construction 
iterative in the sense that we layer the propositions, starting with no disbelief bar at all
and then adding one at a time, after it is clear what happens with the propositions of
the previous layer. Formally, the language of disbelief could be constructed the following
way.
Denition 5.1. Let CL () be the (syntactic) closure of  under the classical connectives.
L
0
0
= fpropositional lettersg, L
0
= CL (L
0
0
)
L
0
i
= f'j' 2 L
i 1
g
L
i
= CL (L
0
i
[ L
i 1
)
Obviously, the language of disbelief L = L
1
. A truth assignment assigns values to the
elements of
S
L
0
i
in such a way that the evaluation of the elements of L is consistent with
Denition 2.6. We will now investigate a bit more in detail how valid truth assignments
develop.
We start with assigning values to the elements of L
0
0
, i.e. to the propositional letters.
It should be clear that any assignment of truth values v 2 f0; u; 1g to the propositional
letters is valid. Of course these are not complete truth assignments as the values for
disbeliefs are not yet considered, but they could be completed by assigning u to all the
disbeliefs, i.e. to the ' 2 L
0
i
; i > 0. Obviously, all of the assignments are valid.
Denition 5.2. A
0
L
0
i
is a function assigning truth values v 2 f0; u; 1g to the elements
of L
0
i
.
A truth assignment A
L
0
i
=
S
A
0
L
0
j
; j  i. That is, it is the collection of all the assign-
ments up to the ith layer.
Remark 25. A
L
0
0
= A
0
L
0
0
The truth assignments A
L
0
i
naturally extend to L
i
. Moreover, the value of an element
of L
i
is uniquely determined by A
L
0
i
. That is, an assignment A
0
L
0
i+1
of a value to a disbelief
of a higher layer has no inuence on the value, but only on the question whether the
combined assignment A
L
0
i
[ A
0
L
0
i+1
is valid. This is an essential point and we want to
illustrate it with a simple example.
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Example 26. Let us restrict the language to two propositional letters a and b.
So L
0
0
= fa; bg, L
0
= fa; b; a _ b; a ^ b; : : : g,
L
0
1
=

a; b; a _ b; a ^ b; : : :
	
, L
1
=

a; b; b _ a; a! b; a _ b ^ a ^ b; : : :
	
.
Now an assignment A
L
0
0
(a) = v
a
, A
L
0
0
(b) = v
b
uniquely determines the values of all the
elements of L
0
, i.e. from the value of the propositional letters we can calculate the value
of their combinations via the classical connectives. For example A
L
0
0
(a) = 1 allows the
conclusion that the under that assignment the value of a _ b is 1, too. If we additionally
have A
0
L
0
1
(a) = 1, neiter the value of a nor that of a _ b would be dierent but as this
combination is in conict with the value restrictions of Table 3 A
L
0
1
= A
L
0
0
[ A
0
L
0
1
is an
invalid truth assignment.
The assignments A
L
0
0
allow us to determine which propositions, constructed of propo-
sitional letters and the classical connectives only, are equivalent. We only have to check
which of them behave alike under all the assignments A
L
0
0
. As the example illustrates,
possible assignments to disbeliefs have no inuence on that.
In other words, even if we expand the truth assignment giving values to disbeliefs,
previously equivalent propositions stay equivalent and propositions that were not equiv-
alent cannot suddenly become so, because at least one assignment remains under which
the propositions behave dierently  the one where all disbeliefs (of the higher layers) are
assigned u.
Continuing this line of thought provides a way to construct all valid truth assignments.
As mentioned above, all assignments A
L
0
0
are valid. Next, we create all assignments A
0
L
0
1
,
i.e. all combinations of assignments of the truth values to all elements in L
0
1
. As we have
an initial set of equivalent propositions in L
0
, we can throw away those assignments that
give dierent values to equivalent propositions.
Now we can combine every single valid truth assignment A
L
0
0
with every single assign-
ment of the the remaining A
0
L
0
1
. Of these combinations, we throw away those which do
not meet the value restrictions of Table 3. This is easily checked, as the A
L
0
0
component
provides us with the value of the propositions in question. The remaining combinations
are the valid A
L
0
1
.
The next step is to expand the equivalence relation to L
1
. This is easily done by
checking which elements of L
1
behave alike under all valid assignments A
L
0
1
. And so on...
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The following observations are essential:
 Two propositions which were not equivalent on a previous layer cannot become
so after introducing a new layer. This is immediate, because we already have at
least one valid truth assignment for the previous layer under which the propositions
behave dierently. Of course, the assumption is that both propositions were already
dened on the previous layer, i.e. that they were elements of the fragment of the
language.
 Two propositions which were equivalent on a previous layer cannot become inequiv-
alent after introducing a new layer. This is because the value of the disbelief has no
inuence on the value of the proposition. As illustrated above, it can only cause a
potential combined assignment to be invalid.
 A disbelief ' introduced at layer i cannot be equivalent with any element  of the
language fragment L
i 1
. To see that, take an arbitrary valid truth assignment for
the level i 1. This uniquely denes the value for any element in L
i 1
, in particular
the one for  . By the value restrictions in Table 3, ' can take at least two dierent
truth values, i.e. there is at least one valid truth assignment for which the values of
' and  dier.
Coming back to our goal of showing that ' 
L
 implies ' 
L
 holds as well, we
can conclude from the last observation that ' and  must have been introduced at the
same layer, i.e. that they are element of the same L
0
i
. We now assume the two disbeliefs
to be equivalent but ' and  not to be equivalent. The latter means that there is a valid
truth assignment A
L
i 1
that assigns dierent truth values to the two. But by the value
restrictions of Table 3 for two dierent truth values, there are diering sets of truth values
that the disbeliefs could take. So there are valid truth assignments that assign dierent
truth values to the disbeliefs, contradicting the assumption.
Whether these properties suce to characterize equivalence remains to be investigated.
Proposition 5.3. There is no ' such that '  >.
Proof. By the denition of the value restrictions in Table 3, independent of the value of
', ' can take the value u, i.e. there is a truth assignment evaluating the disbelief to u.
Consequently, ' cannot be a tautology.
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Proposition 5.4. There is no ' such that '  ?.
Proof. By the denition of the value restrictions in Table 3, independent of the value of
', ' can take the value u, i.e. there is a truth assignment evaluating the disbelief to u.
Consequently, ' cannot be a contradiction.
5.2 A metalogic for inference
In Section 3.3 we gave a short explanation why the language of disbelief may not be rich
enough to allow to write down all the inference rules necessary to capture all valid infer-
ences. Again, nonsatisability played an important rule. In two-valued logic, nonsatis-
ability is equivalent to contradiction, which can be captured syntactically by equivalence
denitions using the symbol ?.
Contradictory propositions are dened equivalent to this symbol. Then the equivalence
denitions can be used for simplications and inference. This can in fact be transferred
to our logic, but just adding a symbol ?
w
is not enough to solve our problem with non-
satisable propositions. They are not necessarily equivalent and may behave dierently
given a truth assignment, as Example 27 illustrates.
Example 27. a ^ :a, b ^ :b; A (a) = 0; A (b) = u
Clearly, both conjunctions are nonsatisable and have dierent truth values given the
assignment. The rst conjunction evaluates to 0, the second to u.
But it is not the pure nonsatisability alone that causes the problems. Satisable
propositions which cause other propositions not to be able to take the value true or false
are just as important. The last example in Section 3.3 illustrates just that. There, we
considered the proposition :' _ '. This case may seem trivial, but there are examples
where neither :' nor ' need to be necessarily true to imply the nonsatisability of '. To
see this consider '! '.
Having this example in mind, it becomes clear that there is no upper bound to the
number of propositions that cause others not to be satisable. The main idea is illustrated
in Example 28.
Example 28. a! b
1
; b
1
! b
2
; : : : ; b
n
! a
Resolution-like inferences demand the capability of expressing the nonsatisability of
a proposition  be it because of the structure of the proposition itself or because a set of
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propositions implies it. Assume a _ b is in the belief set. Knowing a to be nonsatisable
clearly allows the inference of b, but, as illustrated by Example 28, there is an innite
number of sets of propositions that cause a to be nonsatisable.
It is not desirable to have a rule for every one of these sets. It would be more convenient
to have a rule like: If a_ b and a is nonsatisable then b. Rules for :a and a are just not
enough, as Example 29 shows. Even though the two propositions are inconsistent with
the set presented, a is nonsatisable.
Example 29.

'; a! '; a;:a
	
That is why we think a further extension of the language is necessary, or at least
helpful, to infer propositions that the tableau scheme would allow successfully. This
extension, however, will only be used by the inference mechanism and is not available to
the "user" of this logic. So it could be seen as a metalogic for inference. The extended
language will contain two further symbols + and - to denote that a proposition cannot be
evaluated to 1 and 0 respectively. Inference is then done on this extended language and
afterwards all nonstandard sentences are removed. More formally:
Denition 5.5. Let L be the language of disbelief as in Denition 2.1, L
0
def
= fx
+
jx 2 Lg[
fx
 
jx 2 Lg.
L

is the language containing L and L
0
and being closed under negation, conjunction,
disjunction and implication.
Remark 30. Expressions of the form x
+
or x
 
, x cannot contain a further + or  .
Truth assignment and truth valuation for L can be extended to L

in a straightforward
way. The only additional rules are
V
A
 
'
 

def
=
8
<
:
0; V
A
(') = 1
1; otherwise
and
V
A
 
'
+

def
=
8
<
:
0; V
A
(') = 0
1; otherwise
which corresponds to the intuition behind the symbols.
Denition 5.6. Let `

be an inference relation on L

.
 `
L
' if and only if ' 2 Cn

() \ L, where Cn

() = f j `

 g
9
.
9
We will simplify notation, writing ' `  instead of f'g `  .
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In fact we are only interested in the inference relation on our language of disbelief,
but we have problems to formulate rules restricted to that language, so what Denition
5.6 expresses is the following. We do the inference in the extended language L

and then
take the intersection with our language of disbelief.
Our task is now to characterize `

such that `
L
=`
t
, in order to have an entailment
relation that is not dependent on the tableau. The idea is to do so by mutual simulation,
i.e. showing that any tableau rule can be expressed in terms of a set of inferences on L

and that any inference on L

can be expressed by a tableau. Inference on L

can then
be interpreted as linearisation of argumentation across open branches in the tableau.
We have not fully solved this task, but wewill give some intermediate results.
5.3 Nonsatisability
If a proposition ' cannot be satised, (' `

?
w
), '
 
should follow from the empty set,
i.e. `

'
 
should hold, as '
 
is true whatever the evaluation of '.
This is a natural demand. The above '
 
could be interpreted as a new type of tau-
tologies that occurs in the extended language. These tautologies need to be axiomatized,
as well.
Some immediate properties are:
 `

'
 
for all contradictions '
 `

'
 
for all tautologies '
 `

(' ^ :')
 
for all '
 `

(' ^ ')
 
for all '
 `

(' ^ ::')
 
for all '
It is our conjecture that these are the basic cases to which all nonsatisable propo-
sitions can be reduced, but neither do we have a proof for it nor a counterexample. We
were not able to nd an axiomatic or constructive characterization of (all) nonsatisable
propositions, but we will give some of their properties.
Proposition 5.7. ' _  `

?
w
if and only if ' `

?
w
and  `

?
w
.
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Proof. ()) Assume ' _  is nonsatisable, but either ' or  is satisable, i.e. there
is a truth assignment under which ' or  are evaluated to true. By the denition of
disjunction, this would give us a model for ' _  contradicting the assumption.
(() Assume both ' and  are nonsatisable but ' _  has a model. That is, there
is a truth assignment under which the disjunction evaluates to true. By the denition of
disjunction, this assignment must be a model for ' or  contradicting the assumption.
Proposition 5.7 suggests that some kind of disjunctive normal form would be helpful
for characterizing nonsatisable propositions, as then only the disjuncts have to be tested
for nonsatisability.
Proposition 5.8. ' `

?
w
implies ' ^  `

?
w
for any  .
Proof. Assume ' is nonsatisable but ' ^  is satisable. That is, there is a truth
assignment that evaluates the conjunction to true. By the denition of conjunction, this is
only possible if both conjuncts are evaluated to true which contradicts the assumption.
Proposition 5.9. If ' and  do not share propositional letters, then
' ^  `

?
w
if and only if ' `

?
w
or  `

?
w
:
Proof. (() follows immediately from Proposition 5.8.
()) Assume ' ^  `

?
w
, but ' 6`

?
w
and  6`

?
w
, i.e. ' and  are satisable.
Therefore the nished tableau with the root entry ' : 1 has an open path P
1
, and the one
for  : 1 an open path P
2
. If these two paths are appended, the resulting path cannot
contain a contradiction, as ' and  do not share variables, so the tableau with the root
entry ' ^  : 1 has an open path as well, which contradicts our assumption that ' ^  is
nonsatisable.
It follows that the only possibility for ' ^  to be nonsatisable in spite of both '
and  being satisable is for the two conjuncts to share variables, i.e. to be in some way
related. This relationship is to be investigated further.
Proposition 5.10. '!  `

?
w
implies :' `

?
w
.
Proof. Assume '!  to be nonsatisable and :' to be satisable. The latter means that
there is a truth assignment evaluating :' to true. Consequently, the same assignment
evaluates ' to false. By the denition of implication, this assignment evaluates '!  to
true contradicting the assumption.
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Proposition 5.11. '!  `

?
w
implies  `

?
w
.
Proof. Assume '!  to be nonsatisable and  to be satisable, that is, there is a truth
assignment evaluating  to true. By the denition of implication, this truth assignment
evaluates '!  to true, as well. This contradicts the assumption.
The simplest cases would be those where in addition to these properties ' is a tautology
or  is a contradiction (or both). Then, however, the implication could be simplied to
either ' or  using the equivalence relation. In the more interesting case, the condition
is that whenever ' is evaluated to u,  has to be evaluated to 0. Once more, the two are
not independent of each other.
Proposition 5.12. ' `

?
w
if and only if ' 
L
>.
Proof. ()) Assume ' to be nonsatisable and ' not to be a tautology. That is, there is
a truth assignment which evaluates ' to u or 0. By the value restrictions of Table 3, this
would allow an assignment of 1 to '.
(() Assume ' to be a tautology and ' to be satisable. That is, there is a truth
assignment that evaluates the disbelief to true. By the value restrictions of Table 3, this
assignment cannot evaluate ' to true, which contradicts the assumption.
Proposition 5.13. '!  `

?
w
if and only if ' 
L
> and  
L
>.
Proof. ()) Assume '!  to be nonsatisable and ' 6
L
> or  6
L
>.
 ' 6
L
>, i.e. there is at least one truth assignment that evaluates the proposition to
u or 0. By the value restrictions of Table 3, one of these truth assignments evaluates
 to u, as well. By the denition of implication, this assignment evaluates ' !  
to true, contradicting the assumption.
  6
L
>, i.e. there is a truth assignment evaluating  to 0 or u. By the value
restrictions of Table 3, there is a truth assignment evaluating  to true, contradicting
the assumption, as this assignment satises '!  .
(() Assume ' 
L
> and  
L
>. ' !  be satisable, i.e. there is a truth
assignment evaluating the proposition to true. By the denition of implication, ' !  
can be true only if one of the following holds:
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 The truth assignments evaluates ' to false, but this contradicts the assumption of
' being a tautology.
 The truth assignment evaluates  to true, but this contradicts the assumption of  
being a tautology (see Proposition 5.12).
 The truth assignment evaluates both ' and  to u, but this contradicts the assump-
tion of ' being a tautology.
Proposition 5.14. '!  `

?
w
if and only if ' 
L
? and  
L
?.
Proof. ()) Assume '!  to be nonsatisable and ' 6
L
? or  6
L
?.
 ' 6
L
?, i.e. there is at least one truth assignment evaluating ' to u or 1. By the
value restrictions of Table 3, there is one evaluating ' to 0. By the denition of
implication, this will evaluate '!  to 1, contradicting the assumption.
  6
L
?, i.e. there is a truth assignment evaluating  to u or 1. The latter would
already give us a model for ' !  which would contradict the assumption. So
only the case of an evaluation of  to u remains to be considered. By the value
restrictions of Table 3, irrespective of the value of ', ' can be evaluated to u, i.e.
there is a truth assignment doing so. It should be clear that a corresponding truth
assignment can be constructed.
(() Assume ' 
L
? and  
L
?. ' !  be satisable, i.e. there is a truth
assignment evaluating the proposition to true. By the denition of implication, ' !  
can be true only if
 the truth assignment evaluates ' to false. By the value restrictions of Table 3, the
truth assignment then must evaluate ' to u or 1, contradicting the assumption of
' being a contradiction.
 the truth assignment evaluates  to true, contradicting the assumption of  being
a contradiction.
 the truth assignment evaluates both ' and  to u, contradicting the assumption of
 being a contradiction.
These properties inspire some of the inference rules given in Section 5.5. Example 31
shows some nonsatisable propositions.
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Example 31.
 ' ^ '
 ' ^  ^ ( ! :')
 >
 ' ^  ^ (' _  )
5.4 Tautologies
Many of the tautologies we know from classical logic still hold in our logic of disbelief.
This was already implied in Section 5.1. There are some notable exceptions, however.
 ((' ^  )! ) ! ('! ( ! )) 
L
> still holds, but the reverse direction
('! ( ! )) ! ((' ^  )! ) 6
L
>, which can be easily seen by the valua-
tion V (') = V ( ) = u, V () = 0.
 (('!  )! )! (('!  )! ('! )) 6
L
> using the same valuation.
 (:' _  ) ! ('!  ) 
L
> still holds, but the reverse direction
('!  ) ! (:' _  ) 6
L
>, also evaluating ' and  to u. This example illus-
trates once more that implication and disjunction are not interdenable.
As remarked in Section 3.3, nonsatisable propositions also play an important role.
All this means that an axiomatization of the tautologies in our logic will not simply be
an extension of the axioms used for classical logic.
5.5 Inference rules
In the following, we want to present some of the rules for the inference relation `

. In
fact it is a relation between a set of propositions and a proposition,  `

'. In order
to simplify notation in case  contains only one element, we write ' `

 instead of
f'g `

 .
Naturally, `

' for all tautologies '. Further, we assume that all nonsatisable
propositions ' are given and therefore `

'
 
holds. Consequently, for all propositions
 that cannot be evaluated to false, `

 
+
holds. In the following, we will give rules of
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' :' '
+
(:')
 
'
 
(:')
+
0 1 0 0 1 1
u u 1 1 1 1
1 0 1 1 0 0
Table 4: Truth table for the language extension
`

and show that they correspond to the tableau introduced. ' and  are propositions of
L, i.e. they do not contain further
+
or
 
.
' `

'
' ^ '
 
`

?
w
(:')
+
`

'
 
and (:')
 
`

'
+
, so the two are equivalent. Table 4 illustrates this
equivalence, as well.
: ('
 
) `

' and : ('
+
) `

:'
'
 
`

(' ^  )
 
' _  `

'
 
!  
' _  `

 
 
! '
'
 
!  `

' _  
 
 
! ' `

' _  
(' _  )
+
^ :' `

 
+
(' _  )
+
^ : `

'
+
(' _  )
+
`

'
+
_  
+
'
+
_  
+
`

(' _  )
+
(' _  )
 
`

'
 
, analogous for  
('
 
_  
 
) ^ ' `

 
 
('
 
_  
 
) ^  `

'
 
'
+
^  
+
`

(' ^  )
+
'
 
^  
 
`

(' _  )
 
'!  `

 
 
! '
 
'!  `

'
+
!  
+
('!  )
+
^ ' `

 
+
('!  )
+
^ : `

'
 
('!  )
 
`

 
 
('!  )
 
`

'
+
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('!  )
 
`

'
 
! : 
: ('!  ) `

'
: ('!  ) `

: 
Furthermore, `

takes equivalence of propositions into account, satises modus po-
nens, contraposition, and so on. If  `

' then  `

' for any   .
Proposition 5.15. If  `

' then  `

' for any   .
Proof. Let T be the nished tableau with premises .  `

' means that on every open
branch of T , ' : 1 holds.
As   , the tableau with premises  can be constructed from T by adding the
propositions  n  to its open branches. Clearly, after nishing the resulting tableau,
' : 1 still holds on all the open branches.
Proposition 5.16. If  `

' and  `

 then  `

' ^  .
Proof. Let T be the nished tableau with premises .  `

' means that on every open
branch of T , ' : 1 holds. Analogously, on every open branch of T ,  : 1 holds.
Now, assume  `

' ^  does not hold. This means that T contains an open branch
that is compatible with an evaluation of ' ^  to less than 1. This can be tested by
appending ' ^  :< 1 to every open branch of T . Finishing the resulting tableau reveals
that now all branches are closed. This is obvious from the atomic tableaux (t1), (t7), and
(t8) given in Section 3.1.
Consequently, ' ^  : 1 holds on all open branches of T which corresponds to  `

' ^  , contradicting the assumption.
Cn

(S) is consistent if it does not contain ' and '
 
for any proposition ', otherwise
it is inconsistent (and therefore contains ?
w
).
The rule '
 
`

(' ^  )
 
is not necessary for nonsatisable propositions ', as they are
given already (see Proposition 5.8). However, if ' is not satisable for some other reason,
e.g. because ' is in the set of propositions, being able to infer all other conjunctions
that are not satisable any more might be helpful. By equivalence '
+
 (:')
 
, the
same holds for '
+
`

(' _  )
+
. Furthermore, the rules for (' ^  )

can be obtained by
reformulating those for (' _  )

. Example 32 illustrates one case.
Example 32. (' ^  )
 
`

(: (' ^  ))
+
`

(:' _ : )
+
`

(:')
+
_ (: )
+
`

'
 
_  
 
,
i.e. (' ^  )
 
`

'
 
_  
 
.
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Other rules can be derived as well. For example, ' ! ' `

'
 
is a special case of
the rule
 
 
 
1
_  
 
2

^  
1
`

 
 
2
. As (('! ') ^ ') is not satisable, `

(('! ') ^ ')
 
holds, i.e. (('! ') ^ ')
 
is a tautology. Using the rule from Example 32, it follows that
`

('! ')
 
_ '
 
.
('! ') `

 
('! ')
 
_ '
 

^ ('! '). This step is justied by Proposition 5.16
and the fact that the rst conjunct is a tautology which can be inferred from any set of
propositions. Now using the inference rule
 
 
 
1
_  
 
2

^  
1
`

 
 
2
, substituting  
1
with
('! ') and  
2
with ', we get
 
('! ')
 
_ '
 

^ ('! ') `

'
 
.
Analogous argumentations apply to
'! :' `

'
 
,
' `

'
 
,
:' `

(:')
 
,
' `

'
 
,
:' `

'
+
,
:' _ ' `

'
 
,
:' `

'
 
,
' `

'
+
.
In fact, this pattern creates rules for all cases where a (nite) set of propositions 
implies that another proposition ' cannot be evaluated to true. `

(
V
 ^ ')
 
and
substituting  
1
with
V
 and  
2
with ' lets this become obvious.
The question why the rule is (' _  )
+
^ :' `

 
+
and not (' _  )
+
`

:' !  
+
might arise. There is one case for which the second version is not justied. An evaluation
of ' to u and  to 0 clearly satises the rst part, but the implication will not be evaluated
to 1, so the more conservative rst rule is necessary. There are more rules of the rst
type. Similar examples exist for them.
The list of rules we have given might not be complete. Appendix B gives an elaborate
argumentation for the soundness of the rules. A complete axiomatization of the inference
relation is subject to future work.
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6 Conversion of the belief revision framework into an
argumentation framework
6.1 Introduction
During the discussion of the belief revision framework [1] the question arose, whether the
framework could be translated into an argumentation framework and how it would look
like. In this section we want to answer this question partially.
The procedure that calculates the belief set from a given sequence can be divided into
two steps  identifying a belief base, i.e. the correct subset of propositions in the sequence,
and then applying the closure under consequence to that set. So the task of calculating
the belief set can be reformulated to the task: Given a sequence =('
1
; : : : ; '
n
), calculate
Cn (BelBase ()).
In the following, we need the elements of  to satisfy the following property: '
i
6= '
j
for i 6= j. That is, propositions are not allowed to appear twice in the sequence. This
seems to be a strong restriction, but in fact every sequence can be transformed into one
with this property without aecting the belief base or the belief set the sequence produces.
This is done by keeping the latest appearance of the proposition and deleting the other
ones.
Example 33. (a; b; c; a _ b; b; d; c ^ d; d) becomes (a; c; a _ b; b; c ^ d; d)
The reason why this transformation leaves the belief base unchanged is that an earlier
appearance of the proposition in the sequence has no eect. In the process of calculation
the latest occurence has already been considered. If it was consistent then, it was included
and already is part of the belief base. If it was inconsistent then, it still is.
Denition 6.1. Let  = ('
1
; : : : ; '
n
) be a sequence of propositions.
pos

('
i
)
def
= i
maxp

(f'
1
; : : : ; '
m
g)
def
= max
i=1
(pos

('
i
)) ; maxp

(;)
def
= 0
Set ()
def
= f'
1
; : : : ; '
n
g
BelBase ()
def
= B such that
(1) B  Set ()
(2) ?
w
=2 Cn (B) and
(3) :9S(S  Set () ^ ?
w
=2 Cn (S) ^maxp

(S nB) > maxp

(B n S)):
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pos gives the position of a proposition within a sequence. This is the reason why the
proposition should only appear once. If it did not, the number would not be unique and
the denition for the function would have to be more complicated. For the sequence in
Example 33 we have pos (a _ b) = 3, pos (d) = 6.
maxp calculates the positions of all the elements of a set of propositions in a se-
quence and returns the greatest number. For the sequence in Example 33 we have
maxp (fa; b; cg) = 4.
Set simply transforms a sequence into a set.
The rst two conditions of the denition of BelBase are immediate. It has to be a
consistent subset of the propositions appearing in the sequence. The denition is for the
logic of disbelief. This is why the notion of inconsistency is not restricted to contradictions.
The third condition is more complicated so we will present it more in detail. It states
that B can only be the belief base if B beats all other candidate S except itself. S is a
candidate if it is a set that satises the rst two conditions. B beats S if B contains a
proposition ' which is not an element of S and ' appears later in the sequence than any
 that is element of S but not of B.
Example 34.
 Consider  = (a; b;:a).
fa; b; cg does not satisfy condition 1, so it is not a candidate for being the belief
base.
fa;:ag does not satisfy condition 2, so it can be disregarded as well.
S
1
= fbg, S
2
= fa; bg, S
3
= f:a; bg all satisfy the rst two conditions.
S
1
n S
2
= ;, S
2
n S
1
= fag. Obviously, 0 = maxp

(;) < maxp

(fag) = 1, so S
1
is
not a candidate.
S
2
n S
3
= fag, S
3
n S
2
= f:ag. 1 = maxp

(fag) < maxp

(f:ag) = 3, so, as
expected, S
3
wins.
 One possibility to present the the mechanism in a simplied way is not to compare
the candidates but sets of natural numbers. Numbers that correspond to the posi-
tion of the propositions in the sequence are substituted for the propositions. After
elimitating the common subset, the set with the greatest number wins. An empty
set loses agains any nonempty set.
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The example should illustrate that a consistent superset will always beat the subset.
This means that as many propositions as possible are incorporated into the belief base.
Furthermore, later propositions have higher priority. If the common subset is disregarded,
of two consistent sets, the one that has the latest proposition wins.
So calculating BelBase () essentially means: identify the subset of propositions that
has a conict-free closure under inference and that incorporates those propositions as
late in the sequence as possible as well as a maximal number of them. This corresponds
to the selection procedure described in Section 1.2. That is, BelBase () is the set of
propositions from  which were accepted during the calculation of Bel ().
We will show that this selection procedure can be translated into an argumentation
framework. We rst introduce the parts of the argumentation framework that are neces-
sary for our purpose and then prove the correctness of our translation.
6.2 Vreeswijk's Abstract Argumentation System
The elements of a belief set could be seen as conclusions of reasoning processes. In the
belief set, the information about why the propositions are contained in it is lost, how-
ever. Argumentation frameworks can provide this information because they say something
about the interaction between propositions  which propositions support others, which
attack others.
The identication of the belief base can be interpreted as such an argumentation pro-
cess: as these propositions are believed to be true and their conclusions are incompatible
with this proposition, it cannot be incorporated. The task now is to formalize this.
For this purpose, Vreeswijk's Abstract Argumentation System appealed to us. Deni-
tions 6.2-6.13 are from [11].
Denition 6.2. An abstract argumentation system is a triple (L;R;) ; where L is a
language (containing an element ? representing a contradiction), R is a set of rules of
inference , and  is a reexive and transitive order on arguments.
Denition 6.3. Let L be a language.
1. A strict rule of inference is a formula of the form 
1
; : : : ; 
n
! , where 
1
; : : : ; 
n
is a nite, possibly empty, sequence in L and  is a member of L.
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2. A defeasible rule of inference is a formula of the form 
1
; : : : ; 
n
) , where

1
; : : : ; 
n
is a nite, possibly empty, sequence in L and  is a member of L.
A rule of inference is a strict or a defeasible rule of inference.
Remark 35. ! and ) must not be part of the language, i.e. inference rules cannot
be elements of the language. Of course, implication is allowed, but the arrows must be
distinguished. The arrow of the inference rules could be thought of as `.
Denition 6.4. An argument Æ is
1. a member of L: Then prem (Æ) = fÆg, conc (Æ) = Æ, sent (Æ) = fÆg, sub (Æ) = fÆg.
2. a formula of the form Æ
1
; : : : ; Æ
n
! , where Æ
1
; : : : ; Æ
n
is a nite, possibly empty,
sequence of arguments, such that conc (Æ
1
) = 
1
,. . . , conc (Æ
n
) = 
n
for some rule

1
; : : : ; 
n
!  in R, and  =2
S
sent (Æ
i
) :
Then prem (Æ) =
S
prem (Æ
i
) ; conc (Æ) = ; sent (Æ) =
S
sent (Æ
i
) [ fg, sub (Æ) =
S
sub (Æ
i
) [ fÆg .
3. a formula of the form Æ
1
; : : : ; Æ
n
) , where Æ
1
; : : : ; Æ
n
is a nite, possibly empty,
sequence of arguments, such that conc (Æ
1
) = 
1
,. . . , conc (Æ
n
) = 
n
for some rule

1
; : : : ; 
n
)  in R, and  =2
S
sent (Æ
i
) :
Then prem (Æ) =
S
prem (Æ
i
) ; conc (Æ) = ; sent (Æ) =
S
sent (Æ
i
) [ fg, sub (Æ) =
S
sub (Æ
i
) [ fÆg .
So combining elements of the language and rules of inference into trees creates an
argument.
Example 36. Figure 7 shows arguments formed of an argumentation system with the
language fa; b; c; d; e;?g and the inference rules d) a; c; e! ?; a; b! c.
The set of premises of the rst argument is fb; dg, its conclusion is c, the sentences
occuring are fd; a; b; cg, and its subarguments are given in Figure 8.
c
a
@@        
b
^^>>>>>>>>
d
KS
?
c
??
e
__@@@@@@@
?
c
77oooooooooooooo
e
__@@@@@@@
a
@@        
b
^^>>>>>>>>
Figure 7: Argument examples
6 BELIEF REVISION AND ARGUMENTATION FRAMEWORK 60
c
a
@@        
b
^^>>>>>>>>
d
KS
a
d
KS
b d
Figure 8: Subarguments
a
c
77oooooooooooooo
b
^^>>>>>>>>
a
@@
b
OO
d
^^========
Figure 9: Not an argument
Example 37. The tree in Figure 9 does not constitute an argument. The sentence a
appears twice on one branch. This is not allowed by Denition 6.4, which prevents a
sentence from being one of its own premises in an argument.
Denition 6.5. An argument Æ is strict if Æ 2 L; or Æ
1
; : : : ; Æ
n
! Æ, where all Æ
i
are strict
arguments.
Example 38. The left argument in Figure 10 is strict as all subarguments are strict. The
right is not strict as there is a subargument whose top rule is defeasible.
Denition 6.6. Let L be a language and let P  L:
An argument is based on P if the premises of that argument constitute a subset of P ;
a set of arguments is based on P if all its members are based on P .
A member of L is based on P if it is the conclusion of an argument that is based on
P .
a
c
77oooooooooooooo
b
__>>>>>>>>
e
@@
d
^^========
c
OO
a
c
77oooooooooooooo
b
__>>>>>>>>
e
<D



d
Zb=======
=
=
c
OO
Figure 10: Strict and nonstrict argument
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e
c
??        
d
__>>>>>>>
a
OO
b
KS
e
c
??        
d
__>>>>>>>
a
OO
e
c
??        
d
__>>>>>>>
a
OO
c
OO
Figure 11: Arguments
?
c
??        
d
__????????
d
b
@@
e
^^========
c
a
<D       
b
Zb>>>>>>>

1
> 
2
> 
3
Figure 12: Compatibility
Example 39. While the left argument in Figure 11 is based on fa; bg, the middle one is
not. The right argument is not based on the set either, as it does not contain c. The fact
that a is element of the set and there is a rule a! c does not change the matter.
Denition 6.7. An argument  is an underminer of a set of arguments , if Æ <  for
some Æ 2 . In this case,  is undermined by  .
Denition 6.8. An argument Æ is in contradiction if conc (Æ) =?.
Denition 6.9. A subset P of L is incompatible if there exists a strict argument in
contradiction that is based on P: A subset of L is compatible if it is not incompatible.
Compatibility naturally extends to arguments. Thus, a set of arguments  is compat-
ible if conc () is compatible.
Denition 6.10. A base set is a nite compatible subset of L.
Example 40. Consider Figure 12. 
2
is an underminer of the set of arguments f
1
; 
3
g,
as 
2
> 
3
. 
3
is not an underminer of the set of arguments f
1
; 
2
g, as 
3
< 
1
and

3
< 
2
.
The argument 
1
is in contradiction, as its conclusion is ?.
The sets fc; dg, fc; b; eg are incompatible, as there exist strict arguments in contradic-
tion that are based on these sets.
The set fa; b; dg is not incompatible. There exists an argument in contradiction based
on the set, but it is not strict. However, the set of arguments f
2
; 
3
g is incompatible, as
the set of their conclusions is incompatible.
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The sets fc; dg, fc; b; eg are not base sets, as they are incompatible. The sets fb; cg,
fa; b; eg and ; are base sets.
Remark 41. If there exists a strict argument in contradiction based on the empty set,
then there are no base sets for the language.
Denition 6.11. Let P be a base set and let Æ be an argument. A set of arguments 
is a defeater of Æ if it is incompatible with this argument and not undermined by it.
Example 42. Consider Figure 12 again. The argument 
3
and the set of arguments f
2
g
are incompatible, and as the set is not undermined by 
3
, it is a defeater of the argument.
The argument 
2
and the set of arguments f
3
g are incompatible, but as the set is
undermined by 
2
, it is not a defeater of the argument.
Denition 6.12. Let P be a base set. An argument  is in force at level 1 on the basis
of P if it is based on P: Let n>1. An argument Æ is in force at level n on the basis of P ,
written P j
n
Æ, if
1. The set P contains Æ; or
2. For some arguments Æ
1
; : : : ; Æ
n
we have P j
n
Æ
1
; : : : ; Æ
n
and Æ
1
; : : : ; Æ
n
! Æ; or
3. For some arguments Æ
1
; : : : ; Æ
n
we have P j
n
Æ
1
; : : : ; Æ
n
and Æ
1
; : : : ; Æ
n
) Æ and no
set of arguments  that is in force at level n-1 on the basis of P is a defeater of Æ.
Remark 43. Notation is simplied in the following way: Æ
1
; : : : ; Æ
n
! Æ denotes that the
argument Æ is composed of the arguments Æ
1
; : : : ; Æ
n
via the rule 
1
; : : : ; 
n
! , with
conc (Æ
1
) = 
1
; : : : ; conc (Æ
n
) = 
n
; conc (Æ) = .
The set of rules should not include a set that would allow to infer ? from an empty
set of premises, e.g. ! ?, because otherwise the empty set would be a defeater for
all defeasible arguments as it cannot be undermined by any rule. This is, of course, a
reasonable demand. A logic should not be inherently inconsistent.
Denition 6.13. The expression info
n
(P ) denotes the set of arguments fÆ j P j
n
Æg.
An argument Æ is ultimately undefeated if and only if, for some n  1, we have
P j
n+k
Æ, for every k  1:
An argument Æ is provisionally undefeated if and only if, for every n  1, we have
P j
n+k
Æ, for some k  1, and not P j
n+l
Æ, for some l  1.
An argument Æ is ultimately defeated if and only if, for some n  1, the entailmant
P j
n+k
Æ does no longer hold, for every k  1:
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Example 44. Consider the following simple argumentation system: L = fa; b; c; d;?g,
R = f) a;) b;) c;) d; (a; b! ?); (c; d! ?)g. Concerning the order on the argu-
ments, we have ) a = ) b and ) c >) d. We let the base set P be the empty set.
Consequently, no arguments are in force at level 1. As the premises of the defeasible rules
are empty, we only have to check whether the previous level contains defeaters.
1. ;
2. ) a;) b;) c;) d; (a; b! ?); (c; d! ?)
As there are no arguments in force at the rst level, there cannot be defeaters, so
all defeasible rules are in force at the second level. The two strict arguments are in
force as well, as their premises are conclusions from arguments in force at the level.
3. ) c
) a is not in force at this level, as the previous one now contains a defeater  the
set f) bg. They are incompatible and ) a does not undermine the set, as it is not
stronger than any of the arguments contained in it. ) b is not in force for the same
reason. Its defeater is f) ag.
For ) c there is a potential defeater as well  f) dg, but the set is undermined,
because ) c is stronger than ) d, so ) c remains undefeated. ) d, in turn, is
defeated by f) cg.
For obvious reasons, the arguments with conclusion ? are not in force.
4. ) a;) b;) c; (a; b! ?)
) d remains defeated by f) cg, and ) c remains undefeated.
The defeaters for ) a and ) b were not among the arguments in force at the
previous level, so the two are in force again.
5. ) c
The constellation at this level is the similar to that at level 3. ) d remains defeated
and the defeaters for ) a and ) b have reappeared.
6. ) a;) b;) c; (a; b! ?)
7. : : :
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It is obvious that the sets of arguments in force continue to alternate. ) c is ultimately
undefeated. Starting at level 2 it is in force at all levels. ) d is ultimately defeated.
Starting at level 3 it is not in force at any level. Both ) a and ) b are provisionally
defeated. They keep disappearing and reappearing.
Example 44 is a particularily simple example to illustrate the dynamics of the process,
showing how arguments can be provisionally defeated etc. Convergence is not necessarily
reached so soon and alternation need not only comprise two steps.
6.3 The AAS for belief revision
We now dene the components of the argumentation system, so that the procedure given
in Denition 6.12 identies the belief base. The basic idea is to make sure that the
propositions neglected in the original approach are the ones defeated in the argumentation
approach.
Let L be a language and =('
1
; : : : '
n
) ; with '
i
6= '
j
for i 6= j, a sequence as above.
Denition 6.14. R

def
= f) '
i
j '
i
2 g[
fall instantiations of inference rules formulated as strict rulesg.
Note that we do not restrict ourselves to propositional logic or the logic of disbelief
introduced. That is, the results given in the following are of amore general nature. Of
course, we think of applying the results to these twologics.
The propositions from the sequence are added to the inference rules the logic provides
as defeasible arguments with empty premises. It is natural that these inference rules are
strict rules. As the logic does not prohibit inferences that lead to inconsistent sets, the
argumentation framework should not concern itself with this, either. Consistency will be
ensured by the defeasibility of the "premises".
Propositional logic and the logic of disbelief obviously have valid inference rules like
a ! a or a; b _ c ! a. These can be neglected because they cannot be used to form
arguments, as can be seen from Denition 6.4. This is not a restriction, however, as these
rules do not enrich the possibilities. This can be seen in Figure 13. The same conclusion
can be inferred from a subset of the premises of rules like that.
It should be noted that there is an essential dierence between the inference rules
a; b ! a and a ^ b ! a. In the rst, the conclusion is syntactically equivalent to one of
the premises while in the second, premise and conclusion are completely dierent.
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b
a
66mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm
a! b
bbEEEEEEEEE
a
@@
b _ c
aaDDDDDDDD
b
a
@@
a! b
bbEEEEEEEEE
prem : fa; b _ c; a! bg prem : fa; a! bg
Figure 13: "Invalid" inference rule vs. valid ones
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a
b
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L
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a
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1 2 3 1 1 undened
Figure 14: Arguments and their strength
Denition 6.15. Let Arg be the set of all arguments created by R

. strength is a
function that assigns a natural number or undefined to every argument of Arg.
strength (Æ)
def
=
8
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
1; Æ = empty premise
i; Æ = ) '
i
undefined; Æ 2 L
min
2sub(Æ)nfÆg
(strenght ()) ; otherwise
min () is dened such that it takes the the value undefined if one of the elements of
 is undened.
Denition 6.16. The order on arguments Æ
i
is dened by
Æ
1
 Æ
2
if and only if strength (Æ
1
)  strength (Æ
2
)
10
.
Remark 45. The strength of an argument is determined by its weakest "premise". It
should be noted that this denition does not allow to compare all possible arguments,
but as we will always let the base set P be empty, we actually only have arguments with
empty premises, i.e. all arguments start with defeasible rules of the form ) '
i
which we
will therefore call premises. The denition allows to compare all of these arguments.
10
The rst  denoting the order to be dened, the second the common order on natural numbers. We
think this denition to be so intuitive that the ambiguity in notation does not create confusion.
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Example 46. Consider the sequence  = (b; b!
L
a; a), !
L
denoting implication. R

would be f) b;) b!
L
a;) a; (b!
L
a; b! a) ; (a; a! ?
w
) ; : : : g. Figure 14 shows some
arguments with their respective strength. The strength of the rightmost argument is un-
dened because the strength of the subargument a is not dened.
We now choose (L;R;) as follows: Let L be the language used in the belief revision
framework, i.e. propositional language or the language of disbelief. In the rst case ?
coincides with the symbol denoting the contradiction, in the latter we chose ?
w
to be the
symbol for the contradictory conclusion. Further R and  are chosen as in Denitions
6.14-6.16. Using this argumentation system, the above set BelBase of basic beliefs can be
identied by calculating the limit of the inductive warrant (lim
n
info
n
(P )) where the base
set P is empty. The result of the calculation will contain the "premises" that correspond
to the propositions of the sequence that are included in the belief base.
The proof for that will be given in the next two sections, but rst a more complex
example.
Example 47. Consider the sequence  =
 
e; a _ b; b; c ^ c; b! d; d; e; e; a! c

. We will
illustrate the calculation of the belief base using the approach introduced in Section 1.2
and the inductive warrant of the argumentation system that is created by the sequence
and its implied set of rules and order on arguments.
 The calculation starts with the empty set. a! c and e are inserted as they do not
introduce an inconsistency. e is neglected, because it it is not compatible with e.
d and b ! d do not cause an inconsistency and are included. c ^ c is inconsistent
in itself, so it is left out. b cannot be included. Together with b ! d it implies d,
which is inconsistent with d, but the latter isalready included. a _ b is no problem,
however, just like e.
So the belief base is

a! c; e; d; b! d; a _ b; e
	
 As the base set is empty, no arguments are in force at level 1.
1. ;
2.

) e;) a _ b;) b;) b! d;) d;) e;) e;) a! c; : : :
	
) c^c is not in force as the empty set is a defeater of the argument. This means
that the argument is ultimately defeated, because the empty set is subset of
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any set, so this defeater will appear at all levels. For all the others, the previous
level does not contain defeaters.
There are some further arguments in force at this level. These are strict con-
tinuations of the arguments given, e.g.
 
b! d; b

! d.
3.

) a _ b;) b! d;) d;) e;) a! c; : : :
	
) e is not in force as it is defeated by feg on the previous one.
) e is not in force as it is defeated by

e
	
on the previous one.
) b is not in force as it is defeated by

) b! d;) d
	
on the previous one.
4.

) e;) a _ b;) b! d;) d;) e;) a! c; : : :
	
) e and ) b remain defeated as their defeaters are still among the arguments
in force at the previous level. ) e reappears because its defeater was defeated
at the previous level.
5. The fth level is like the 4th.
So the argumentation system identies the same proposition from the sequence.
We want to show that this works in general and not only in this example. Our rst
task in doing this is to prove that the limit lim
n
info
n
(P ) exists, i.e. that (1) P = ;
has a unique extension. Then we have to prove that (2) the "premises" in this extension
correspond to the base beliefs in the above set BelBase ().
6.4 Unique extension of the system
In order to prove (1), it is sucient to show that on the basis of P there are no provisionally
defeated arguments (see Conjecture 4.5.6. in [11]). If there were provisionally defeated
arguments, it would not be clear which propositions from the sequence would appear in
the belief set.
The only arguments whose top rule is defeasible are the ones of the form ) '
i
, i.e.
the ones that encode the elements of the sequence. Simply put, an argument is defeated
provisionally because it is either based on (provisionally defeated) arguments of the above
form or it is one of that form itself. That is, several extensions could be interpreted as
several possible belief bases, but, as we know, the belief base is uniquely determined.
The basic idea of the main proof is to show that, assuming an argument ) ' were
provisionally defeated, its defeater would have the argument itself among its premises.
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It is then possible to transform the defeater with the purpose of removing the argument
from the premises which results in a defeater that contains only ultimately undefeated
arguments leading to a contradiction to the assumption.
Lemma 6.17. If an argument  : Æ
1
; : : : ; Æ
n
! Æ is provisionally defeated, then there is a
subargument Æ
i
that is provisionally defeated.
Proof. Assume all subarguments Æ
1
; : : : ; Æ
n
are ultimately undefeated, then the argument
 is ultimately undefeated as well (follows from Denition 6.12), leading to a contradiction.
Assume any subargument Æ
j
is ultimately defeated, then  is ultimately defeated as
well, leading to a contradiction.
Which shows, that there must be a subargument Æ
i
that is provisionally defeated.
Lemma 6.18. An argument Æ
1
; : : : ; Æ
n
! Æ has the same strength as ) ' if and only if
its weakest premise is ) '.
Proof. Follows immediately from the denition of strength.
Lemma 6.19. Let Æ = Æ
1
; : : : ; Æ
n
! Æ and  be arguments.
If  [ fÆg is a defeater of  then  [ fÆ
1
; : : : ; Æ
n
g is a defeater of  .
Proof. Assume  [ fÆg to be a defeater and  [ fÆ
1
; : : : ; Æ
n
g not to be a defeater of  .
The latter means that either  undermines [ fÆ
1
; : : : ; Æ
n
g or  is not incompatible with
 [ fÆ
1
; : : : ; Æ
n
g.
  undermines  [ fÆ
1
; : : : ; Æ
n
g. Either  undermines , which contradicts the as-
sumption of [fÆg being a defeater of  , or  undermines fÆ
1
; : : : ; Æ
n
g. This would
mean that  > Æ
i
for some 0 < i < n. By Lemma 6.18, this would imply that  > Æ,
contradicting the assumption as well.
  is not incompatible with  [ fÆ
1
; : : : ; Æ
n
g. But clearly, the set ofarguments that
can be constructed by applying strict rules starting with the set  [ fÆg [ fg is
asubset of the arguments constructed by starting with  [ fÆ
1
; : : : ; Æ
n
g [ fg. If?
w
is not among the conclusions of the latter, it cannot be amongthe conclusions of the
former. This contradicts the assumption that  [ fÆg is a defeater of  .
6 BELIEF REVISION AND ARGUMENTATION FRAMEWORK 69
Denition 6.20. A set of arguments  is a minimal defeater of an argument  if  is a
defeater, but no subset of  is a defeater of  .
Proposition 6.21. Let (L;R;) be dened as above and let P be the empty base set.
Then there is no provisionally defeated argument based on P .
Proof. From Lemma 6.17 immediately follows that it is sucient to show that there are
no provisionally defeated arguments of the form ) '.
Assume there is a nonempty set of provisionally defeated arguments of the form) '.
Let  be the strongest argument among them.
In the following, we consider all minimal defeaters of  . They can be partitioned into
three groups.
1. Defeaters containing ultimately undefeated arguments only.
2. Defeaters containing at least one ultimately defeated argument.
3. Defeaters containing no ultimately defeated argument and at least one provisionally
defeated argument.
There cannot be a defeater of the rst type. This would lead to a contradiction with
the assumption that  is provisionally defeated.If there was one of the rst type,  would
be ultimately defeated.Not all of the defeaters can be of the second type. If they were, 
would be ultimately undefeated, contradicting the assumption. In ourconsiderations we
can neglect the defeaters of the second type  starting ata particular level, they are not
among the defeaters of  any more.
So we can restrict our attention to the defeaters of the third type which obviously
have to exist. Let  be an arbitrary minimal defeater ofthe third type of  .
All the arguments in  are of equal orgreater strength than  . Otherwise,  would
undermine and  would not be a defeater. In particular, allprovisionally defeated argu-
ments in  are of equal strength with . They cannot be of greater strength. If there was
one, by Lemma6.17 and Lemma 6.18 there would exist a provisionallydefeated argument
of the form ) ' with greater strengththan  which contradicts the assumption that  is
the strongestargument of that form.
Repeating the essential point: all provisionally defeated arguments in  are of equal
strength with  . That is,  is among the premises of all the provisionally defeated argu-
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ments. Furthermore,  is the weakest premise of every provisionally defeated argument
in .
With this knowledge, we can construct a defeater that contains only ultimately unde-
feated arguments leading to a contradiction with the assumption that  is provisionally
defeated. So, the set of provisionally defeated arguments is smaller. Then we apply the
proof to the next strongest argument in the now smaller set and continue doing so until
the set is empty. This leads to a contradiction to the assumption that there is a nonempty
set of provisionally defeated arguments of the form ) '.
The construction of the defeater is based on the iterated application of Lemma 6.19.
An argument Æ = Æ
1
; : : : ; Æ
n
! Æ is broken down into its components if  2 sub (Æ
i
) for
some i. Æ is then removed from  and all Æ
i
are added to . The new  is still a defeater
for  . This is continued until there is no argument with a strict top rule left that has 
as a subargument.
Now all arguments in  n fg are ultimately undefeated. If this was not the case,
by Lemma 6.17 a provisionally defeated argument ^ of the form ) ' with ^ >  would
exist, which contradicts the assumption that  is the strongest of these arguments. Since
 [ fg = , it is clear that  n fg is incompatible with  . Consequently,  n fg is a
defeater of  which contains only ultimately undefeated arguments, leading to the desired
contradiction.
6.5 Correspondence between BelBase () and the premises
In order to show (2)  that the "premises" in this extension correspond to the base beliefs
in the above set BelBase ()  we introduce the following notation.
Denition 6.22. Let  = ('
1
; : : : ; '
n
).
res
i
()
def
= ('
n i
; : : : ; '
n
)
R
i
def
= f) '
j
j '
j
2 res
i
()g [ finference rules as strict rulesg
getf (X)
def
= f' j) ' 2 Xg
lim
n
info
R
i
n
(X) is the extension of the argumentation system (L;R
i
;) with the base
set X.
Let  be a sequence of sentences of L with denitions for pos; : : : as above. res
i
()
represents the tail part of  with length i + 1. (L;R
i
;) is the restriction of the ar-
gumentation system to the shortened sequence. Note, however, that all calculations of
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pos; strength; : : : are still executed with respect to the entire sequence . getf (X) is used
to extract the premises from a set, i.e. the propositions of the sequence. lim
n
info
R
i
n
(X)
is the limit of the inductive warrant of the argumentation system that is restricted to the
tail of the sequence.
Example 48. Consider the sequence  =
 
e; a _ b; b; c ^ c; b! d; d; e; e; a! c

.
res
0
= (a! c), res
1
=
 
e; a! c

, res
5
=
 
c ^ c; b! d; d; e; e; a! c

R
0
= f) a! c; strict rulesg, R
5
=

) c ^ c;) b! d;) d;) e;) e;) a! c; : : :
	
getf
 
) c ^ c; b! d;) d; e _ c;) e
	
=

c ^ c; d; e
	
From res
n 1
() =  immediately follows BelBase(res
n 1
()) = BelBase() and
getf
 
lim
m
info
R
n 1
m
(;)

= getf
 
lim
m
info
R
m
(;)

. This means that it suces to show
that BelBase(res
i
()) = getf
 
lim
m
info
R
i
m
(;)

, which we will do inductively.
Proposition 6.23. BelBase(res
i
()) = getf
 
lim
m
info
R
i
m
(;)

.
Proof. We rst show that BelBase(res
0
()) = getf
 
lim
m
info
R
0
m
(;)

.
res
0
() = ('
n
)
(a) If '
n
is contradictory:
 BelBase(res
0
()) = ;, as ?
w
2 Cn (f'
n
g)
 getf
 
lim
m
info
R
0
m
(;)

= ;, as) '
n
is incompatible with ; and therefore ultimately
defeated
(b) If '
n
is not contradictory:
 BelBase(res
0
()) = f'
n
g
 getf
 
lim
m
info
R
0
m
(;)

= f'
n
g (as ) '
n
is the only premise for all possible argu-
ments and is not contradictory)
From (a) and (b) follows BelBase(res
0
()) = getf
 
lim
m
info
R
0
m
(;)

.
Assume BelBase(res
i
()) = getf
 
lim
m
info
R
i
m
(;)

, we then show
BelBase(res
i+1
()) = getf

lim
m
info
R
i+1
m
(;)

.
(a) ?
w
2 Cn
 
'
n (i+1)
	
[ BelBase(res
i
())

 BelBase(res
i+1
()) = BelBase(res
i
())
6 BELIEF REVISION AND ARGUMENTATION FRAMEWORK 72
 As ) '
n (i+1)
has lower rank than all other defeasible rules, it cannot contribute
to a defeat, but as it is incompatible with ultimately undefeated premises, it is
ultimately defeated.
So getf

lim
m
info
R
i+1
m
(;)

= getf
 
lim
m
info
R
i
m
(;)

.
(b) ?
w
=2 Cn
 
'
n (i+1)
	
[ BelBase(res
i
())

 BelBase(res
i+1
()) = BelBase(res
i
()) [

'
n (i+1)
	
 As ) '
n (i+1)
is compatible with everything ultimately undefeated so far, it is not
defeated and therefore ultimately undefeated as well.
So getf

lim
m
info
R
i+1
m
(;)

= getf
 
lim
m
info
R
i
m
(;)

[

'
n (i+1)
	
.
From (a) and (b) follows BelBase(res
i+1
()) = getf

lim
m
info
R
i+1
m
(;)

, which together
with BelBase(res
0
()) = getf
 
lim
m
info
R
0
m
(;)

implies
BelBase() = getf
 
lim
m
info
R
m
(;)

.
We have thereby shown that the identication of the base beliefs can be done within an
argumentation framework. Belief revision would then be accomplished by adding another
defeasible rule of the form ) ' with a strength greater than the previous ones. This
result does not provide any insight in the inference mechanism, though.
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7 Conclusion and future work
Motivated by the desire to model contraction within a particular belief revision framework,
we have started to developed a full-blown logic of disbelief. That is, we allowed the nesting
of the disbelief connective. In our logic, this came for the price of a third truth value and
a quite complicated structure of models. We formulated desirable properties of the logic
and especially of the behaviour of the disbelief connective.
The modication of the classical tableau approach allowed to achieve one of the major
results of the paper  the proof of soundness and completeness of the logic developed. We
showed that the language introduced might not be rich enough to arrive at an axioma-
tization of the logic. We proposed a further extension of the language and proved some
results obtained in the attempt to nd an axiomatization.
We showed that the deduction theorem does not hold. This implies that an axiomati-
zation of equivalence and inference will not be a mere extension of the classical relations.
The implementation we developed during our research is briey presented. As it
directly implements the tableau approach, it allows to try out simple examples and to
test propositions, which would be much more time consuming if the truth tables had to
be developed by hand.
We proved that the belief revision framework can be embedded into an argumentation
framework. The translation illustrates how the propositions in the sequence defeat one
another during the calculation of the belief base.
Applied in the belief revision framework, our logic not only models contraction but
allows greater expressiveness, e.g. with propositions like ' !  formalizing that an
express disbelief in one proposition implies belief in another.
Remarks on "Some Logics of Belief and Disbelief" [2]
Although our notion of disbelief diers slightly from that implied by examples 2 and 3
in that paper, our framework is able to handle them as demanded there. The examples
are basically expressing that it should be possible to believe in disjunction '
1
_ : : : _ '
n
,
while disbelieving in each individual '
i
. This problem is known as the lottery paradox 
while disbelieving that a particular ticket will win, it is believed that one will win. It is
easily seen that the (weak) disjunction as dened for our logic does not allow that, but
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the strong one which can be dened in terms of implication and negation
11
can meet this
demand. In our opinion, what is called disbelief in those examples is merely a strong
tendency towards negation.
Our logic does not have the property (D_)  if   `  and   `  , then   `  _  
satised by the logic GBD. This property was argued against in the paper, but we want
to note that this property does not necessarily force disbelief in tautologies.
Like the authors of [2], we think that agnosticism should be possible, i.e. that f';:'g
should be satisable. By (D_), now ' _ :' holds as well, i.e. disbelief in a tautology.
But is ' _ :' still a tautology? In a two-valued logic it surely is, but looking at it
with a three-valued logic in mind: : : At least (D_) does not look as strange any more.
It is obvious that a logic satisfying (D_) cannot solve the lottery paradox as the two
express opposites. While the one demands that  _  is a consequence of

;  
	
, the
other demands

;  ;  _  
	
to be consistent.
An intuition for the disbeliefs provided in [2] is that the beliefs are information acquired
by the agent itself and disbeliefs are information from a dierent source about what does
not hold. The logic BD was said to be pitched at the right level, but we nd the restriction
that
the worlds that the sources of an agent may regard as impossible have to
be worlds that the agent itself regards as possible
counterintuitive. It is not clear to us why not both agent and source should be allowed
to regard a certain world as impossible.
The approaches in [2] have a quite simple structure. They separate beliefs and dis-
beliefs into dierent sets and connect them by a set of rules. As mentioned above, our
approach does not distinguish between the two. The price for that is having to allow a
third truth value and a more complex inference scheme. When trying to generalize the
logics in [2] by allowing the nesting of the disbelief bar, the structure of sets will become
more complicated and so will the rules necessary.
11
' _
s
 
def
=:' !  . The dierence with respect to the weak disjunction is, that if both disjuncts are
evaluated to u, their disjunction is evaluated to 1.
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Future work
There is much potential for future work. It is worthwhile to investigate the relationship
between our logic of disbelief and modal logic. There are modal logics that allow to
express the state of an agent's knowledge. Maybe a similar approach works for beliefs
and disbeliefs, i.e. modal operators could model the disbelief connective.
An investigation into the relationship between our disbelief approach and other existing
approaches would be of interest. As the latter are restricted to propositions and the
disbelief in those and do not allow a nesting of the disbelief bar up to now, it is the
question whether they can be embedded in our approach. Further, it is open if and how
they can be generalized to more complicated structures of disbelief.
It would be nice to nd axiomatizations of the inference and equivalence relations, as
well as for nonsatisable propositions and tautologies. This would make the picture of
our logic, which is dominated by semantic characterization up to now, more complete.
It might be interesting to investigate fragments of the logic. Possible candidates are
the restriction to classical propositions and disbeliefs in them, the restriction to classical
propositions and disbeliefs of higher order, i.e. allowing only purley classical propositions
or disbeliefs below a disbelief bar. Furthermore, certain connectives could be removed,
e.g. allowing only implication and negation or not allowing implication.
We have not attached a particular interpretation to the third truth value u in our logic
other than its not being true or false. Dunn/Belnap's 4-valued system provides a very
appealing notion for the two extra values  no information and contradicting information.
It might be interesting how to interpret a disbelief operator in this setting. In the light
of the belief revision framework introduced, this does not make sense, as the state of
contradicting information will not be arrived at, but for other applications this might
be dierent. Again, the essential point will be how to dene the interaction between a
proposition and the disbelief in it.
The implementation could be optimized. For examples with a greater number of
propositions, it shows weaknesses in running time and memory problems. Right now,
branches are checked for clashes after every step of expansion. This is very expensive,
though, because it involves equivalence checks that require tableau proofs themselves. An
expansion step, on the other hand, is a simple procedure on lists. So doing the check for
clashes less frequently could speed up the program considerably. Also, reorganizing the
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program so that intermediate results which are not needed any more are thrown away to
clear the stack could allow the program to handle more complicated examples.
Weak version of the logic
In the logic we have investigated so far, a set of propositions was inconsistent if its closure
under consequence forced an evaluation of one proposition to 1; as well as to u or 0 and
so on, i.e. to two dierent truth values. A version of the logic might be considered, where
an inconsistency only occurs if a proposition is forced to take the values 1 and 0, so the
notion of inconsistency would be weaker.
However, the result is not very appealing, as it would mean that ' ^ ' would not be
inconsistent since there would be an open branch with evaluations of ' to 1 and u. This
would defeat the purpose of the logic. Therefore, we believe a further investigation not
to be fruitful.
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A Notes on notation
 :; _; ^; ! connectives negation, disjunction, conjunction, implication. Their mean-
ing depends on the logic used and should be clear from the context.
 ! in Section 6 to denote strict rules, see Denition 6.3
 ' connective bar to denote disbelief in a proposition '
  equivalence, a subscript may indicate the underlying logic
 ? bottom, contradiction, proposition evaluated to 0 under all valuations
 ?
w
inconsistency, not evaluated to 1 by any valuation, in classical propositional
logic the same as ?, but not so in the logic of disbelief
 j= consequence relation between a set of propositions and a proposition, a subscript
may indicate the underlying logic
 ` entailment relation between a set of propositions and a proposition, a subscript
may indicate the underlying logic or method
 ; empty set
 * operator for revision of an epistemic state by new information
 -,+ as superscripts of a proposition denote its nonsatisability / the nonsatisability
of its negation
  sequence
 '; ;  propositions, sentences of propositional logic or logic of disbelief, depending
on the context
  a set, usually of propositions
 0; u; 1 truth values: false, undened, true
 a; b; ::: propositional letters; in Section 6 also to denote arguments
 A truth assignment function, see Denition 2.4
 A
L
0
i
, A
0
L
0
i
truth assignment function for language fragments, see Section 5.1
A NOTES ON NOTATION 81
 bar see '
 Bel Belief set, see Section 1.2
 CL () syntactic closure under classical connectives, see Section 5.1
 Cn () closure under consequence, a subscript may indicate the underlying logic
 E entry in a tableau
 lim
i
X the limes of X for i approaching innity
 L language (without subscript: language of disbelief, see Denition 2.1; otherwise
as indicated in the text)
 L
i
, L
0
i
language fragments, see Section 5.1
 P in Section 3 (possibly with a subscript) to denote a path/branch in a tableau; in
Section 6 used to denote a subset of a language
 T (possibly with a subscript) tableau
 v (possibly with a subscript) denotes a truth value (in the context of tableaux also
<1 or >0, see Section 3.1)
 V truth valuation function, see Denition 2.4, a subscript may indicate the truth
assignment function that gives rise to it
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B Soundness of the inference rules
By using truth tables and the denition of truth valuations for the extended language, it
can be easily seen that the rules from Section 5.5 are sensible. The remarks below show
that they are in correspondence with the tableau introduced in Section 3, as well
12
.
 ' `

' trivially, on every open path where ' : 1 holds, ' : 1 holds
 ' ^ '
 
`

?
w
: no open branch with ' : 1 and ' :< 1
 (:')
+
`

'
 
: in an open branch (:')
+
: 1 if :' : 1 or :' : u , so ' : 0 or ' : u,
i.e. '
 
: 1 holds
 (:')
 
`

'
+
: analogous
 : ('
 
) `

': : ('
 
) : 1, if '
 
: 0 if and only if ' : 1
 : ('
+
) `

:': analogous
 '
 
`

(' ^  )
 
: if '
 
: 1, (t6) will not have an open branch
 ' _  `

'
 
!  : by (t9) in any open branch where not ' : 1,  : 1 holds
 ' _  `

 
 
! ': analogous
 '
 
!  `

' _  : using the denition of a truth assignment for an open branch,
if there is no entry with ', it is assigned u, so '
 
is assigned 1, i.e. the implication
is true. Only if  is assigned 1, so that there has to be an entry  : 1 on the path,
then the disjunction is assigned 1 as well. If ' : 1 is an entry on the path, the
disjunction holds, too, and otherwise, the implication holds only if  is evaluated
to true satisfying the disjunction.
  
 
! ' `

' _  : analogous
 (' _  )
+
^ :' `

 
+
: (t11) excluded, by (t9) - left branch excluded, in right one
 
+
holds, by (t10) - left branch excluded, in right one  
+
holds
 (' _  )
+
^ : `

'
+
: analogous
12
In connection with tableaux, ' `

 reads: in any open tableau branch where ' holds,  holds as
well. '
+
holds if and only if ' : 1 or ' : u; a branch in which '
+
holds can be open only if :' : 1 is not
an entry on that path, analogous for '
 
.
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 (' _  )
+
`

'
+
_  
+
: (t11) excluded, by (t9),(t10), one of '
+
and  
+
holds in
every branch, so '
+
_  
+
holds in every one
 '
+
_  
+
`

(' _  )
+
: analogous
 (' _  )
 
`

'
 
: (t9) excluded, by (t10), (t11), (t1) '
 
holds in every branch
 (' _  )
 
`

 
 
: analogous
 ('
 
_  
 
)^ ' `

 
 
: in an open branch ' and '
 
cannot both hold, so  
 
has to
be true if the disjunction is true
 ('
 
_  
 
) ^  `

'
 
: analogous
 '
+
^  
+
`

(' ^  )
+
: obvious
 '
 
^  
 
`

(' _  )
 
: likewise
 ' !  `

 
 
! '
 
: by (t12), it is easily checked that the implication holds in
every branch
 '!  `

'
+
!  
+
: likewise
 ('!  )
+
^ ' `

 
+
: (t14) excluded, by (t13) - right branch excluded, in left one
 
+
holds, by (t12) - left and right branch excluded, in middle one  
+
holds
 ('!  )
+
^: `

'
 
: (t14) excluded, by (t13) - left branch excluded, in right one
'
 
holds, by (t12) - middle and right branch excluded, in left one '
 
holds
 ('!  )
 
`

 
 
: (t12) excluded, by (t13), (t14)  
 
in all open branches
 ('!  )
 
`

'
+
: (t12) excluded, by (t13), (t14) '
+
in all open branches
 ('!  )
 
`

'
 
! : : (t12) excluded, by (t13) and (t14) implication holds in
every branch
 : ('!  ) `

': by (t3),(t14)
 : ('!  ) `

: : by (t3),(t14)
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C Examples for the tableau implementation
We present some simple examples to illustrate how the tableau implementation of the
logic can be used. In some cases, we only give a sample predicate to show its usage. In
others, we reproduce the output of the program, as well.
dr(X) is the abbreviated form of the predicate dorevision(X;R). Basically, its argu-
ment is the sequence from which the belief base and then a partial belief set is calculated.
 The rst example is particularily simple. Here the sequence is  = (a).
dr([a]). The output of the program is:
The base belief set is: [a]
preparing the base set
starting inference
[polishing the belief set, [a]]
[a]
is the belief set created by the base belief set
[a]
The second, third and fourth line are only status information telling the user what
the program is currently doing. Information of this kind is notinteresting now, so
we will omit it, in the following.
 The second example is more interesting. The corresponding sequence is  = (a;:a).
dr([a, nott(a)]). Output:
Integration of a leads to inconsistency.
The base belief set is: [nott(a)]
[nott(a)]
is the belief set created by the base belief set
[nott(a)]
The rst line tells the user that a could not be integrated into the belief base as this
would have introduced an inconsistency. But like in the rst example the belief set
is not particularily interesting.
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 dr([dis([a, b]), bar(b)]), i.e.  =
 
a _ b; b

. Output:
The base belief set is: [dis([a, b]), bar(b)]
[dis([a, b]), a, bar(b)]
is the belief set created by the base belief set
[dis([a, b]), bar(b)]
Here the belief set is more interesting. As mentioned in Section 4.3, the propositions
of the belief base are expanded to all its subpropositions which are then tested. Here
a is found to be a consequence of the belief base.
 dr([dis([a, b, c, d]), dis([a, b, con([nott(c), nott(d)])])]), i.e.
 = (a _ b _ c _ d; a _ b (:c ^ :d)). Output:
The base belief set is: [dis([a, b, c, d]),
dis([a, b, con([nott(c), nott(d)])])]
[dis([a, b, c, d]), dis([a, b, c]), dis([a, b, d]),
dis([a, b, con([nott(c), nott(d)])]), dis([a, b])]
is the belief set created by the base belief set
[dis([a, b, c, d]), dis([a, b, con([nott(c), nott(d)])])]
This example illustrates one of the possibilities of improving the program. a_ b _ c
and a_ b_d are mentioned in the belief set although it is more than clear that they
hold, because a _ b is contained as well. Leaving propositions like that out of the
belief base makes the output more readable  especially if the belief sets are bigger.
 dr([a, imp(a, dis([b, c])), bar(b), bar(c)]), i.e.  =
 
a; a! _c; b; c

. Output:
Integration of a leads to inconsistency.
 dr([a, bar(a), bar(nott(a)), bar(bar(a)), bar(bar(nott(a))), imp(a, bar(nott(a)))]),
i.e.  =
 
a; a;:a; a;:a; a! :a

. Output:
Integration of bar(nott(a)) leads to inconsistency.
Integration of bar(a) leads to inconsistency.
Integration of a leads to inconsistency.
The base belief set is: [bar(bar(a)), bar(bar(nott(a))),
imp(a, bar(nott(a)))]
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Apart from the calculation of the belief base and partial belief set that are induced by
a given sequence, the tableau implementation can be used to check whether propositions
are tautologies, equivalent, satisable, etc.
prove(X) checks whether a proposition X is a tautology.
 Is (a! b)! ((b! c)! (a! c)) a tautology?
prove(imp(imp(a, b),imp(imp(b, c), imp(a, c)))). The answer is
Yes
 prove(imp(a, b), show). Output:
[fin, open, [a, 1], [b, u], [imp(a, b), l], [imp(a, b), u]]
No
Of course, a ! b is not a tautology. The optional second argument show forces
the output of an open branch, i.e. of a noncontradictory assignment that evaluates
the proposition to a value other than 1. Entries of a branch can be open or n to
indicate that the branch is open and nished or entries of the form ['; value]. The
value l means less than 1, i.e. it corresponds to < 1 from the denition of atomic
tableaux.
 An example from Section 5.4: ((' ^  )! ) ! ('! ( ! )) is a tautology.
prove(imp(imp(con(a, b), c), imp(a, imp(b, c)))).
But the reverse implication ('! ( ! ))! ((' ^  )! )?
prove(imp(imp(a, imp(b, c)), imp(con(a, b), c)), show). Output:
[fin, open, [a, u], [b, u], [c, 0], [con(a, b), u],
[imp(a, imp(b, c)), 1], [imp(b, c), u], [imp(con(a, b), c), u],
[imp(imp(a, imp(b, c)), imp(con(a, b), c)),l],
[imp(imp(a, imp(b, c)), imp(con(a, b), c)), u]]
No
eq(X; Y ) checks the equivalence of two propositions X and Y .
 eq(a, a).
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 eq(a, nott(nott(a))).
 ::a  : (a! : (b! (c! b)))?
eq(nott(nott(a)), nott(imp(a, nott(imp(b, imp(c, b)))))). Output:
Yes
The predicate satisfiable(X) tests whether the proposition Xas a model.
 satisable(con(a, bar(a))).
 satisable(con(a, b), show). Output:
[fin, open, [a, 1], [b, 1], [con(a, b), 1]]
Yes
Again, an optional second argument show causes the program to output an open
branch  if there is one  representing a possible assignment.
 Does (a! (b! a))! (a ^ a) have a model?
satisable(imp(imp(a, imp(b, a)), con(a, bar(a)))). Output:
No
The last example illustrates a weakness of the simple inference approach of just check-
ing the subpropositions. createbeliefset([con(dis(a; b); dis(c; bar(b)))]): triggers the con-
struction of the belief set of (a _ b) ^
 
c _ b

. The result given is
[con([dis([a, b]), dis([c, bar(b)])]), dis([a, b]), dis([c, bar(b)])]
However, it should be clear that this is an example of a general case of resolution. As
not both b and b can be true, the disjunction a_ c holds as well. Explicitly checking that
by using the predicate isconsequenceof(X; Y ), where X is a proposition and Y a list of
propositions, conrms this.
isconsequenceof(dis(a, c), [con(dis(a, b), dis(c, bar(b)))]).
But as a_ c is not among the subpropositions, it is not tested by the inference engine.
